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THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MERGERS:
RESTORING "LOCAL CONTROL" AS A
FACTOR IN MERGER POLICY
RICHARD M. BRUNELL*

As the pace of large corporate mergers has increased recently, so
too have the reports of concerns by civic leaders about the negative
effects of mergers on communities losing corporate headquarters,
including a loss of civic leadership, philanthropy, jobs, and
investment. Such adverse social consequences of mergers are not
presently relevant to antitrust analysis, which dismisses so-called
"noneconomic" values in favor of narrow efficiency or consumer
welfare objectives. Yet it is widely accepted, although generally
ignored, that preserving "local control" of business, and other
supposedly noneconomic values, were the predominantconcern of
Congress in restrictingmergers under the federal antitrustlaws.
In a challenge to current antitrust discourse, this Article maintains
that the loss of local control should be restoredas a factor in merger
policy. A review of the legislative history of the 1950 CellerKefauver amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act shows that
Congress sought to preserve local control of business because it
believed that distantly controlled firms were, in today's parlance,
less socially responsible than local firms. The Article demonstrates
that Congress's historic concern is borne out to a significant extent
by modern social science literature. Empiricalstudies indicate that
communities often (but not invariably)face significant social costs
from mergers when a major corporate headquarters is lost and
control of a firm is transferred from locally based managers to
distant or "absentee" managers, a process referred to as
"delocalization." Moreover, the loss of corporate headquarters
may impair overall social welfare and efficiency, thus suggesting
* Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I am grateful to Joe
Brodley, Jon Baker, Peter Carstensen, Rick Dagen, Dan Richards, Michael Meurer,
Spencer Waller, Harry First, Robby Robertson, Tina Miller, and Anita Lichtblau for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Adam Ramos for his excellent research
assistance. Thanks also to the participants in the 2005 consumer antitrust colloquium at
the Loyola University Chicago School of Law, the Law and Economics Workshop at the
Boston University Law School, and to the Roger Williams University School of Law for its
financial support.
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that restoring local control as a consideration in merger analysis is
consistent with modern welfare economics. The Article develops a
doctrinal argument for considering the loss of local control as a
"noncompetitive" factor that would militate against mergers with
uncertain competitive effects, outlines various alternatives for
incorporating this factor into antitrust merger review, and also
offers a proposal for considering the loss of local control as an
adverse factor in the analysis of bank mergers under federal
banking law.
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SOCIAL COSTS OFMERGERS

"We're not owned by the citizens of Boston ... we're owned by
shareholders."
-Chad Gifford, former CEO of FleetBoston Financial Corp.,
explaining why he merged his bank with Charlotte-based Bank
of America, despite regret over the demise of the largest
financial institution based in New England.1
"Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of
general public interest when corporate headquarters are moved
away from a city and State."
-Justice Lewis Powell, concurring in Edgar v. Mite Corp.2
INTRODUCTION

Philanthropic and community leaders in Boston bemoaned Bank
of America's recent takeover of FleetBoston, which eliminated the
last of the major banks based in Boston (and New England).3 They
predicted a decline in contributions to local charities and nonprofit
institutions, a lessened commitment to community and small-business
lending needs, a loss of local employment, and a general loss of
leadership in the regional economic and social development for which
FleetBoston was renowned.4 Notwithstanding Bank of America's
public commitments on some of these matters, these leaders had

1. Tina Cassidy, The CEOs Explain the Urge to Merge: D'Alessandro, Gifford on
Gay Marriage,Big Business Deals, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 2004, at F14.
2. 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
3. See, e.g., Steve Bailey, Steve Bailey Downtown: After Chad and David, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2003, at F1 (lamenting end of "a New England banking tradition" dating
to 1784).
4. See id.; see also Maureen Dezell, Fleet Arts Funding to Change Under Bank of
America, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2004, at D25 (Boston philanthropic leader stating that
the merger " 'radically removes the last of our hometown honeys,' " adding that "there is
no question ... that FleetBoston is bowing out of a model leadership role that is admired
throughout the country and unmatched in Greater Boston").
5. Bank of America pledged to maintain employment levels in New England, set a
goal for charitable giving of $1.5 billion over ten years, and pledged $750 billion to
community development over ten years. See Hearingon Banks, Mergers, and the Affected
Communities Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 277-87 (2004) (prepared
testimony of Anne Finucane, President, Northeast, Bank of America Corp.) (calling
pledges "aspirational goals" but stating that it would be bad business not to honor them).
Bank of America asserted that its $1.5 billion charitable giving goal represented an
increase, on an average annual basis, of more than forty percent over the combined
charitable giving of both banks prior to the merger. See Press Release, Bank of America,
Bank of America Announces New $750 Billion Community Development Goal (Jan. 7,
2004), available at http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?s=press-releases&item
=4566. However, the author calculates that Bank of America could reach that goal merely
by increasing its nominal giving by about six percent per year.
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reason to be concerned: many community leaders in California
contended Bank of America's "civic performance" there had
deteriorated after NationsBank acquired it in 1998 and moved its
headquarters from San Francisco to Charlotte.6

Ironically, the "local control" case against Bank of America's
acquisition of FleetBoston had been made forcefully by the chief
executives of Fleet Financial and BankBoston when those two New

England banks merged to form FleetBoston in 1999. Fleet Financial
CEO Terrence Murray, testifying before the Federal Reserve Board
in favor of the Fleet/BankBoston deal, argued that "this merger is [a]
necessary step to ensure that New England continues to have a major
locally based banking presence."7 Waxing poetic, Murray explained:
Chad and I both grew up with banks headquartered here in
our home region, banks managed by people who cared about
New England and its people. I don't want my children or my

grandchildren living in a New England whose economic fate is
dictated from outside the region.

I want them to have local

institutions that are strong and sophisticated, but that make
decisions locally with New Englanders in mind. So many
American cities have lost that.8

6. See, e.g., Letter from Rhea L. Serna, Cal. Reinvestment Comm., to A. Linwood
Gill 1II, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond (Jan. 21, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) ("Bank of America is less responsive on affordable housing, small business,
consumer accounts, community contributions, investments, vendor purchasing, and other
products and programs than in 1998."); see also Christian Berthelsen, BOFA Completes
Break with S.F. Chief of Key Unit to Charlotte, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 31, 2001, at Bi
(reporting that the move of a major business line to Charlotte broke a promise made by
the former CEO of NationsBank to keep the business in San Francisco). But see, e.g.,
Letter from A. Lee Blitch, S.F. Chamber of Commerce, to A. Linwood Gill III, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Richmond (Jan. 6, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(contending that Bank of America remained active in the San Francisco Chamber of
Commerce after the NationsBank acquisition and remained a top contributor to nonprofit
organizations in the community).
7. 1. FED. RESERVE BD., TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC MEETING REGARDING THE
PROPOSED MERGER OF FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. AND BANKBOSTON CORP. 16

(1999) [hereinafter FLEET/BANKBOSTON HEARING].
8. Id. at 22. Murray added, "I grew up in New England, went to school here, and
I've worked in banking here for almost four decades. This is my home and this is home to
Fleet and BankBoston and our tens of thousands of dedicated employees. Our legacy will
be a large global institution domiciled in New England with deep community
commitments." Id. at 22-23. BankBoston CEO Chad Gifford testified that he shared
Murray's "passion for preserving the hometown banks in the region, serving the individual
cities and communities that make up this great fabric." Id. at 24. Echoing Murray's
remarks, Gifford added, "I,too, am a New Englander. I'm a son of a former New England
bank chairman, so the importance of a strong, locally-based banking organization has been
with me for a long, long time .... Id at 24-25.
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Many local business and community groups had in fact endorsed the
Fleet/BankBoston deal because of the importance of maintaining
local control of the banks.9
The loss of local control has been raised as an issue before
banking regulators in many large bank mergers. Indeed, it is a
common concern among local commentators and community leaders
whenever an important locally based company is taken over by an
out-of-state firm and its headquarters removed to a distant locale, as
recent headlines confirm.1" As an initial matter, this Article examines
whether these concerns are justified and, in particular, whether the
change in the geographic locus of control of a business as a result of a

9. See Fleet Financial Group, Inc., 85 Fed. Res. Bull. 747, 753 n.35 (1999) ("Some
commentators supported the proposal because it would result in a large banking
organization headquartered in New England, which would provide local jobs and maintain
local control over banking and investment decisions relevant to the region."). For
instance, the President of the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, a highly regarded
business group, testified that "having a corporate headquarters in Boston makes a huge
difference in terms of that company's commitment to the community, whether that
commitment takes the form of leadership, dollars, volunteer support, or an overall level of
energy." FLEET/BANKBOSTON HEARING, supra note 7, at 283 (testimony of Michael
Widmar). He noted that financial services institutions headquartered in Boston, including
both BankBoston and Fleet, "have been particularly conscientious in meeting their public
responsibilities," and that, "[i]n contrast, when local corporations are bought out by outof-state entities, a sharply reduced commitment to this community inevitably follows." Id.;
see also id. at 451-52 (president of New England Legal Foundation, a free-market oriented
business group, testified that "the economic well-being of New England, and all the best
interests of individuals and companies doing business here ... are all better served if we
can preserve a large, strong, regionally based commercial lender in New England, which is
what this merger contemplates").
10. See, e.g., William Ryberg, Shareholders Agree to Sell 'American Classic" But
Uncertainty Remains: Will Maytag Brands-and Iowa Jobs-Disappear?,DES MOINES
REG., Dec. 23, 2005, at A8 (reporting concerns over effect of merger of Maytag and
Whirlpool on town of Newton, Iowa, where Maytag had been headquartered since 1893);
Ted Griffith, MBNA Sale Fuels Job Fears in State; Deal that Cuts 6,000 Jobs Signals End of
Era, NEWS J. (Wilmington, Del.), July 1, 2005, at 1A (reporting that Bank of America's
buyout of MBNA, Delaware's largest private employer, "will have a major impact on
Delaware's economy and its charitable agencies"); Eric Heisler, Big Changes in Store, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 1, 2005, at Al (reporting concern of St. Louis officials over
acquisition of St. Louis-based May Department Stores by Federated Department Stores);
William M. Bulkeley & Ryan Chittum, Boston Again Confronts the Loss of a Big
Corporate Headquarters,WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2005, at B7 (reporting concern of Boston
civic leaders over Gillette's decision to sell the company to "out-of-towners," the third
such sale of a major local company in recent years); Janet Adamy, Sprint's Move Causes
Anxiety in Kansas City, WALL ST. J.,Dec. 17, 2004, at B1 (reporting Kansas City was
"likely to feel the pain more than most places after its largest employer, Sprint Corp.,
relocates its main office" in connection with merger with Nextel).
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merger" has adverse impacts on the community losing a corporate
headquarters.
The transfer of control of a business from locally based owners
or managers to distant or "absentee" managers is a process referred
to as "delocalization." It occurs not only when a national or global
firm acquires a smaller company whose markets or operations are
local or regional, but also when the acquired company itself is a
national or global company.' 2 In the latter event, the acquired
national or global company is delocalized in the sense that its local
headquarters is eliminated and its senior managers are no longer
rooted to the local community. A corporate "home town" becomes
merely a branch of an ever-larger enterprise.
Corporate
delocalization does not simply imply that control is being shifted
"from one location to another," but rather suggests "the elimination
of place as an important variable in the new economy."' 3
A review of the available empirical evidence suggests that the
concerns of local community leaders over the loss of a corporate
headquarters are justified: delocalization by merger often (but not
invariably) involves short- and long-term social costs to the
community, including lower civic involvement, philanthropy,
employment, and investment. These social costs, which may be
significant if the community has been particularly dependent on the
firm, arise from several factors, but two are particularly noteworthy.
First, distant managers are less likely than locally based managers to
be subject to the local community's social norms that otherwise
11. Here and throughout the Article, by "merger" I mean acquisition of a company
regardless of the legal form of the acquisition.
12. Occasionally, the firm that is technically the acquirer will be the one to move its
corporate headquarters to the locale of the acquired firm, as in the case of the Sprint and
Nextel merger. See Adamy, supra note 10.
13. Charles H. Heying, Civic Elites and Corporate Delocalization: An Alternative
Explanationfor Declining Civic Engagement, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 657, 666 (1997),
available at http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/search?sortspec=relevance&authorl=heying&full

text=&pubdate-year=&volume=&firstpage=.
This Article does not address policy
concerns associated with the relocation of a corporate headquarters unconnected with a
merger, notwithstanding that such a relocation may have consequences for the community
losing control that are similar to those resulting from a merger. There are two reasons.
First, merger law-the focus of this Article-has nothing to say about such a relocation.
Second, it is the elimination of a place-dependent locus of control of a significant business
enterprise that is the focus of concern; a relocation merely substitutes one locus of local
control for another and is more likely to have offsetting benefits for the community
gaining the new headquarters than in the case of a merger. See infra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text (discussing state and local incentives for relocating corporate
headquarters); infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of
mergers on the headquarters of an acquiring firm).
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influence managerial discretionary behavior.t4 Second, to the extent
that the acquired firm has operated primarily in a given local

community or region and the merged firm operates on a national or
multiregional basis, the merged firm will be less dependent on the
local community.
Despite the evidence of community harm and the widespread
concerns of community leaders, the loss of corporate headquarters by
merger is not generally perceived to be a significant issue by

policymakers, or at least not one that merits any legal attention.15
The conventional view is that while perhaps unfortunate for the city
or community involved, the loss of a corporate headquarters resulting

from a merger is the natural result of a dynamic economy that is
dependent on the free flow of capital.16 Current legal doctrine neither
affords relief to communities adversely affected by mergers nor even
addresses the issue of the loss of local control of businesses.17
14. Corporate law scholarship concerning the separation of ownership and control of
the corporation posits that managers have significant discretion to make decisions that do
not necessarily maximize corporate profits or shareholder value. See generally ADOLPH
A.

BERLE

& GARDINER

C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION

AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY (1932); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964). Sociology
and business scholarship suggests that corporate managers' discretionary conduct will
differ depending on the identity of the managers and the social networks of which they are
a part. See generally Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SoC. 481 (1985) (elaborating the concept of social
embeddedness as a critical factor in economic behavior); Einer Elhauge, SacrificingProfits
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (discussing the importance of social
norms to managerial behavior).
15. See, e.g., William Testa et al., The Changing Relationship Between Headquarters
and Cities, CHI. FED. LETTER, Mar. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/
publications/fedletter/cflmarch2005_212a.pdf (summarizing recent Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago conference on "Headquarters and Cities"). Testa and his colleagues conclude:
BEHAVIOR:

Many cities have experienced a similar wave of mergers and acquisitions and with
it have lost familiar headquarters' names and prestige. Yet, underneath the
upheaval, successful cities continue to grow their own companies in several ways
so that the occasional loss of a headquarters through a merger or acquisition is
often not that significant.
Id. at 4. They suggest that cities can counter the negative effects of a loss of headquarters
through merger by "emphasiz[ing] such fundamentals as transportation and
communications infrastructure and providing those high-quality public services that serve
to create and retain global businesses and their employees." Id.
16. Cf. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK

& DANIEL

R. FISCHEL, THE

ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38-39 (1991) (noting that dislocation is inherent in
economic progress and "to try to stop the wrenching shifts of a capitalist economy is to try
to stop economic growth").
17. Federal and state worker-notification laws require firms covered under the laws to
give advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs, but such laws do not directly address

156
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Corporate law gives corporate managers free rein to ignore
community interests.18 And private law offers little relief to
communities harmed by business relocations. 9 Federal antitrust law
governing mergers-section 7 of the Clayton Act-considers only

whether a merger may reduce competition and today focuses almost
exclusively on whether a merger enhances or facilitates the merged
firm's ability to exercise market power.2" While certain industries,
such as banking, are subject to regulatory oversight of mergers that is
supposed to take into account "public interest" considerations, the
loss of local control of banks has not been a concern of federal
banking regulators in recent years.2 1
There is also little legal scholarship addressing the issue of
delocalization. To be sure, corporate law scholars have written in

general about the external effects of corporate behavior on
nonshareholder constituencies,22 and in the hostile takeover context
in particular. 3 But they have not focused on the significance of the

change in the geographic locus of control of the corporation.24

the elimination of a corporate headquarters and, in any event, provide scant protection for
workers. See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and
America's ErodingIndustrialBase, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1866-77 (1993).
18. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 17-18 (1986) (noting that "corporate
managers.., are supposed to make corporate decisions so as to maximize the value of the
company's shares," subject to independent legal obligations). However, many states have
corporate constituency laws that at least permit directors to sacrifice shareholder gain for
the welfare of the community. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 763-76 (canvassing legal
authority giving directors discretion to sacrifice corporate profits to further public interest
goals).
19. See, e.g., Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264,
1266 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that Youngstown steelworkers and the community had no
basis in contract, promissory estoppel, or property to stop company from closing plant and
causing economic tragedy for the region); Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
506 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a town had no remedy to keep
General Motors from moving plant after town had granted tax abatements to GM based
on assurances of jobs). But see Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,
40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 618-21 (1988) (arguing that courts should recognize property rights
that would protect workers' and a community's reliance on long standing relationship with
a firm).
20. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(collecting essays emphasizing public character of corporations).
23. See, e.g., John Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 435 (suggesting a legitimate
role for state legislation to protect stakeholders in hostile takeovers).
24. Progressive corporate law scholars have focused principally on employee
stakeholders, rather than the local community as stakeholder. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 22.
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Moreover, while there is a substantial legal literature on the "public"
aspect of local control, which concerns issues of federalism and local
government power, there is no comparable literature on the
desirability of federalism (or local power) in the "private," economic
sphere. And while antitrust scholars and economists once concerned
themselves with the adverse social consequences of large mergers,26
such concerns have been sublimated in the wake of the
marginalization in antitrust discourse of so-called "noneconomic"
values. 7
This Article challenges current antitrust discourse and argues
that the social costs of delocalization should be taken into account to
a limited extent in the analysis of mergers under section 7 of the
25. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2257 (2003)
(maintaining that reconceived home rule could be effective in combating urban sprawl);
John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence
of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002) (arguing that devolution of power to state
and local governments and civil associations is more responsive to social norms than
"centralized democracy"); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. MeCahery, The New
Economics of JurisdictionalCompetition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second Best
World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997) (contesting law-and-economics claims that regulatory
power should be devolved to the local level).
26. See, e.g., THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPORATION (Betty Bock et al. eds.,
1984) (studies growing out of Columbia Law School conference on the relationship
between corporate size and worker alienation, corporate philanthropy, community impact,
technological change, and political impact); THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, MARKET
STRUCTURE, AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (John J. Siegfried ed., 1980) [hereinafter
ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE] (proceedings of a conference sponsored by the Bureau of
Economics of the Federal Trade Commission); see also David W. Barnes, Nonefficiency
Goals in the Antitrust Law of Mergers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 787, 790, 828-35 (1989)
(arguing that merger law should incorporate a broad view of social welfare that
systematically takes into account certain "nonefficiency" goals, including the protection of
community well-being).
27. The leading antitrust treatise criticizes "noneconomic" goals in antitrust as
incoherent and indefensible. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW $ 111 (2d ed. 2000). There are dissenting voices. See, e.g., Maurice E.
Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249,
249 (2001) (arguing that evaluation of media mergers under antitrust laws should consider
diversity of ownership and impact of merger on the marketplace of ideas); Brett H.
McDonnell & Daniel A. Farber, Are Efficient Antitrust Rules Always Optimal?, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 807, 811 (2003) (suggesting that proper economic evaluation of
antitrust regimes should go beyond product market allocative efficiency effects and
consider the effects of antitrust policy on political institutions, corporate governance,
wealth distribution, and risk bearing); see also C. Edwin Baker, Commentary, Media
Structure, Ownership Policy, and the First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005)
(contending that structural change in the nature of the ownership of media companies may
have adverse social consequences because high-level executives of large, publicly traded
media companies will likely be more responsive to profit maximization imperatives than
heads of smaller, more local concerns, who are more likely to be responsive to journalistic
considerations and community needs that produce positive externalities).
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First, the

legislative history of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to section
7 demonstrates that the loss of local control of business was an
important concern of Congress in restricting mergers. While this is
hardly news, it is a point that has been largely forgotten by courts and
scholars alike. Second, taking into account delocalization as a factor

in merger analysis can improve social welfare and efficiency.28 The
costs of the negative externalities borne by a community losing a
corporate headquarters through merger may well exceed the benefits

of a merger, including any benefits that accrue to the headquarters
city of the acquiring firm and any gains in operating efficiency.29
28. 1 mean to use the terms "social welfare" and "efficiency" in the sense that law and
economics scholars commonly use the terms. Social welfare refers to a normative
evaluation based on how legal rules affect individuals' welfare, taking into account the
distribution of income, while efficiency refers to wealth maximization, or the Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency criterion, which ignores distributional considerations. See Louis KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18-38 (2002).

For purposes of this

Article, I ignore the significant normative and methodological objections raised by legal
scholars to the use of welfarism and/or efficiency in legal analysis generally. See, e.g.,
Mark Kelman, Hedonic Psychology, PoliticalTheory, and Law: Is Welfarism Possible?,52
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2004); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.

485 (1980).
29. While some acquisitions improve operating efficiency, many, if not most, do not.
See Frederic M. Scherer, The Merger Puzzle, in FUSIONEN 1, 20 (W. Franz et al. eds., 2002)
("Many mergers, and perhaps the majority, fail to live up to expectations and may indeed
may make matters worse rather than better."); Dennis C. Mueller, Merger Policy in the
United States: A Reconsideration, 12 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 655, 677 (1997) ("The
empirical findings on the effects of mergers imply that mergers are actions by managers
that are likely to be efficiency reducing, even when they do not worsen competition.").
The preponderance of the studies of the effects of mergers in the United States shows no
increase in profitability or in other measures of economic performance. See Mueller,
supra, at 667-69 (reviewing literature); see also F.M. Scherer, A New Retrospective on
Mergers, 28 REV. INDUS. ORG. 327, 340 (2006) (review of historical data on mergers and
productivity provides no significant support for the hypothesis that more intense merger
activity leads to higher productivity growth at the national level). At the same time,
studies of stock market performance show that while target shareholders earn premiums,
acquiring firms' returns are negative, and mergers may reduce net shareholder wealth. See
Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm
Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 758-59, 762-63 (2005) (finding that in
merger wave of 1990s, acquiring-firm shareholders lost an aggregate $216 billion, which
exceeded target shareholder gains by $90 billion, as measured by change in stock price
right after the merger announcement; however, average acquisition created wealth for
acquiring-firm shareholders); Dennis C. Mueller, The Finance Literature on Mergers: A
CriticalSurvey, in COMPETITION, MONOPOLY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 161,178-

83 (M. Waterson ed., 2003) (review of the finance literature shows significant postacquisition declines in shareholder value of acquiring firms when measured over sustained
period after the merger); James A. Fanto, Breaking the Merger Momentum: Reforming
Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 280-84 (2001)
(canvassing studies showing that large majority of "mega-mergers" tend to decrease
shareholder value). There are contrary views. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. KAPLAN, MERGERS
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Further, the loss of local control itself may be inefficient insofar as the
merged firm's lessened commitment to the community inhibits
investment by community stakeholders that would benefit the firm
and the community in the long run. More generally, reducing the
number of corporate headquarters of large public companies in the
economy may impair efficiency by limiting the extent to which
positive social norms influence managerial behavior.
This Article proceeds in four main Parts. Part I reviews the
economics, business, and sociology literature on the relationship
between local control on the one hand and civic engagement,
philanthropy, employment, and investment on the other, and it
explores the efficiency and social welfare implications of
delocalization through mergers. Part 1I reviews the legislative history
of the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 and argues that preserving local
control is a legitimate antitrust concern in merger policy. Insofar as
considering delocalization introduces a "noncompetitive" factor into
merger law, this Part argues that such an approach is consistent with
certain aspects of modern antitrust jurisprudence and makes sense
when conventional competitive analysis is uncertain. Part III details
alternative ways for incorporating the loss of local control as a factor
in merger review within the bounds of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
each of which would make merger law somewhat more restrictive.
Part IV considers the limitations of using antitrust as a tool to address
the social concerns arising from delocalization, and it offers a
proposal for considering the loss of local control as a factor in bank
mergers under the "convenience and needs" prong of the Bank
Merger Act.
I. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DELOCALIZATION

Observers commonly perceive that the transfer of control of a
locally based business to absentee managers has significant adverse
effects on the local community.3" Indeed Supreme Court Justices
AND ACQUISITIONS:

A FINANCIAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE (2006), available at

http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings.pdflkaplan.statement.pdf
(concluding
from
studies that acquisitions create economic value, although the empirical evidence is not
uniform); ROBERT F. BRUNER, DEALS FROM HELL: M&A LESSONS THAT RISE ABOVE

THE ASHES 13 (2005) (maintaining that studies show that "shareholders of buyers
generally earn the required rate of return on investment"). However, a full review of the
economics and finance literature is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. See, e.g., SOPHIA A. MUIRHEAD & AUDRIS D. TILMAN, CONFERENCE BD., THE
IMPACT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 10 (2000)

("Among communities, the perception of the effects of mergers and acquisitions ...
uniformly negative."); see also supra note 10 (citing recent news articles).

is
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ranging from William 0. Douglas to Lewis Powell have noted these
effects. For example, in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,3 1 a
case involving the acquisition of a New England brewery by a multiregional firm in the early 1970s, Justice Douglas observed:
Control of American business is being transferred from local
communities to distant cities where men on the 54th floor with
only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before them
decide the fate of communities with which they have little or no
relationship. As a result of mergers and other acquisitions,
some States are losing major corporate headquarters and their
local communities are becoming satellites of a distant corporate
control.32
Douglas suggested that "the acquisition of local business units by
out-of-state companies" was likely to cause "local employment to
suffer, local payrolls to drop off, and responsible entrepreneurs in
counties and States [to be] replaced by clerks."33 He cited the city of
Goldendale, in his home state of Washington, as an example: "It was
a thriving community-an ideal place to raise a family," he lamented,
"until the company that owned the sawmill was bought by an out-ofstate giant. In a year or so, auditors in faraway New York City, who
never knew the glories of Goldendale, decided to close the local mill
and truck all the logs to Yakima. Goldendale became greatly
crippled."34
If Douglas's concerns appear quaintly sentimental, no such
charge can be leveled against Justice Powell, who echoed these
concerns a decade later when he matter-of-factly observed the
"inevitable" adverse consequences of the loss of local control. In
Edgar v. Mite Corp.,3 5 a case in the early 1980s involving a challenge
to a state corporate law restricting takeovers, Justice Powell
commented:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and
multinational corporations tend to be located in the large cities
of a few States. When corporate headquarters are transferred
out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers,
the State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably
suffer significantly. Management personnel-many of whom

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

410 U.S. 526 (1972).
Id. at 541-42 (Douglas, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 543.
Id.
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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have provided community leadership-may move to the new
corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable,
and educational life-both in terms of leadership and financial
support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of
corporate headquarters.36
A considerable body of empirical and theoretical literature
supports the perception of Douglas and Powell that the loss of local
The next
control of business has adverse social consequences.
Sections review this literature.
A.

Participationin Community Affairs

The significance of local control of business has been the subject
of studies by sociologists and others at least since a classic study
conducted by C. Wright Mills and Melville Ulmer in 1946 for the
Senate Small Business Committee.3 7 Mills and Ulmer found that civic
welfare was lower in what they called "big-business" cities (i.e., those
dominated by a few absentee-owned large corporations) than in
comparable "small-business" cities (i.e., those with a large number of
smaller, locally owned firms). They attributed the difference in civic
welfare-as measured by factors related to health, housing,
sanitation, incomes, education, and recreation-largely to the fact
that the small-business cities had greater "civic spirit," i.e.,
"widespread participation in civic affairs on the part of those able to
benefit a community by voluntary management of civic enterprises."38
Mills and Ulmer claimed that civic spirit tended to dry up in bigbusiness cities because "there is no economic incentive for officials of
absentee-owned corporations 'to be someone civically [sic].' ""
Mills and Ulmer's work has seen something of a renaissance in
the sociological literature, with researchers that follow a "civic
community perspective" maintaining that "locally oriented capitalism
and civic engagement are the foundations of civic institutions that
nurture trust and cooperation among citizens."4 Along these lines,
36. Id. at 646 n.* (Powell, J., concurring in part).
37. C. WRIGHT MILLS & MELVILLE J. ULMER,

SMALL BUSINESS AND CIVIC
WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SMALLER WAR PLANTS CORPORATION TO THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. NO. 79-135

(1946).
38. Id. at 22-23.
39. Id.
40. Charles M. Tolbert et al., Civic Community in Small-Town America: How Civic
Welfare Is Influenced by Local Capitalismand Civic Engagement, 67 RURAL SOC'Y 90, 92
(2002) [hereinafter Tolbert et al., Civic Community]; see also Charles M. Tolbert et al.,
Local Capitalism, Civic Engagement, and Socioeconomic Well-Being, 77 SOC. FORCES 401,
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sociologist Robert Putnam has suggested that the erosion of "social

capital" in America may be attributable in part to changes in
economic scale, including the "replacement of community-based

enterprises by outposts of distant multinational firms. "41

A number of studies since Mills and Ulmer have shown that
managers of locally owned or controlled firms tend to participate in

community affairs to a greater extent than executives of "branch"
plants of national firms. For example, a Harvard Business School

study analyzing the community involvement of 180 companies in
Boston, Cleveland, and Miami found that "[l]ocally headquartered

companies do most for the community on every measure," including
having "the most active involvement by their leaders in prominent
local civic and cultural organizations."42 Another study examined the

structure of urban leadership in the Atlanta metropolitan area over a
six-decade period and found that "the central core of civic
leadership" of the city was overwhelmingly and "consistently
dominated by the highest-ranking executives" from locally based
firms, notwithstanding the influx of national firms since the 1960s.43
Managers of large branch plants did not participate in local affairs to
the extent that their importance to the economy would have
suggested.'
Yet another study-of a cluster of small cities in
Michigan ("Lake Cities")-reported:

421 (1998) (finding that measures of local capitalism, such as the number of small
manufacturing firms and family farms, were associated with higher socioeconomic
indicators); Charles M. Tolbert II, Minding Our Own Business:
Local Retail
Establishmentsand the Future of Southern Civic Community, 83 Soc. FORCES 1309, 1311
(2005) (finding strong correlation between local retail orientation and key quality of life
outcomes).
41. Robert D. Putnam, Democracy in America at the End of the Twentieth Century, in
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: EAST AND WEST 233, 256 (D. Rueschemeyer et al.

eds., 1998); see also Christopher Marquis & Gerald F. Davis, Golfing Alone? Local
Corporations, Elite Cohesion and Community Social Capital, 1986-1998, at 10 (Sept. 7,
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/cmarquis/Golfing
%20Alone%209-7-04.pdf. (noting that "research ... suggests that the presence of local
businesses has a significant influence on the vitality of the civic and non-profit sectors that
are central to Putnam's argument").
42. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WORLD CLASS:

THRIVING LOCALLY IN THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY 178-79 (1995). The study categorized firms in terms of headquarters
location (local, nonlocal but domestic, and foreign) and compared the twenty largest local
employers in each category in each of the three cities. See id. at 178.
43. See Heying, supra note 13, at 660-61. Moreover, since the 1960s, the level of
social cohesion of "elite leaders" (indicating the breadth of civic engagement of elites)
reportedly declined significantly, which the author attributed to the increasing
delocalization of Atlanta's businesses. See id. at 663.
44. Id.

2006]

SOCIAL COSTS OF MERGERS

[N]one of the absentee corporations have any local executives
serving as members of the boards of any of five local
foundations, of school and hospital boards, or of benevolent
associations otherwise. Local owners, meanwhile, are generally
active in community affairs and in the leadership of most of
Lake Cities' foundations and voluntary associations.45
The common explanation for the greater civic participation of
local owners and managers is that they are more invested in the
community personally and financially than "distant" owners and
managers.46 In contrast to local firms that have managers with strong
local roots, branch firms are managed either by "outsiders" with no
local ties who are brought in for short-term assignments4 7 or by locals
who have less ability to benefit the community because they lack
sufficient autonomy or prestige 48 or have less incentive because their
professional advancement will require them to move.49

45. Ivar Berg & Janice Shack-Marquez, Corporations, Human Resources, and the
Grass Roots: Community Profiles, in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPORATION,
supra note 26, at 219, 249; see also TERRY L. BESSER, THE CONSCIENCE OF CAPITALISM:
BUSINESS SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO COMMUNITIES 78-79 (2002) ("Every piece of
evidence we examined on this issue, whether prior research, in-depth interviews,
theoretical explanations, or the data from [the author's] Iowa telephone interviews, tells
the same story. Local businesses report higher levels of contributions to local social
betterment than nonlocal businesses."); Robert Schulze, The Role of Economic
Dominants in Community Power Structure, 23 AM. SOC. REV. 3, 4-7 (1958) (classic study
showing that as businesses in a medium-sized midwestern town were absorbed by
absentee-owned corporations, the business community withdrew from active and overt
participation in the public life of the city).
46. See Tolbert et al., Civic Community, supra note 40, at 92 ("Locally oriented
production firms are likely to contribute to the civic culture because the owners and
managers are socially and financially invested in the community .... "); see also MILLS &
ULMER, supra note 37, at 23 (noting that "[m]ere self interest dictates that the
businessman in the small-business city should be someone civically [sic]").
47. See Robert N. Stern & Howard E. Aldrich, The Effect of Absentee Firm Control
on Local Community Welfare: A Survey, in ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, supra note 26, at
162, 163 (suggesting that the advent of the absentee-owned corporation resulted in a
decline of commitment to the community because "professional managers sent to run
these branch plants were more concerned about their careers in the larger corporation
than with the quality of community life"). But see Jon M. Shepard & James G.
Houghland, Jr., OrganizationSize, ManagerialMobility, and CorporatePolicy: A Study of
the Community Participation of Managers, in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN
CORPORATION, supra note 26, at 163, 182 (finding that the mobility of managers did not
negatively affect their community participation, which may be due to the fact that
companies "transfer executives who are viewed as relatively capable and promising," and
therefore may be encouraged by the company or community actors to become involved in
community affairs).
48. See KANTER, supra note 42, at 180 ("Managers far from headquarters are
sometimes unable to do things for their business operations, let alone for the
community."). In an article about the plight of Dayton, Ohio, after the takeover of
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Not all of the sociological literature supports the thesis that

absentee control of firms is destructive of civic welfare. As a general
matter, insofar as community involvement by business executives is
profit-maximizing to the firm, one would not expect the identity (or
geographic location) of the firm's managers to make much difference
to their degree of community involvement. One study showed that
the larger the firm, and especially the larger the plant, the more likely

the firm was to encourage its production managers to participate in
the community and that absentee control of a firm had no significant
effect on the degree of participation of such managers. 0 Another
study suggested that the number of local businesses in a community
was not associated with the degree of political participation by others

in the community.51 Further, one can imagine an absentee-controlled
numerous local firms by large national firms, the author noted that "[t]he entire
community ...has less access to corporate power and money. More of Dayton's top
executives are accountable to headquarters somewhere else, and ... a lot of them aren't
even in Dayton half the time; they're on airplanes." Sara Rimer, A Hometown Feels Less
Like Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,1996, at Al. The president of a large community college
lamented, "There used to be more C.E.O.'s who could make immediate decisions on
community issues [but now] there is more checking with corporate offices outside Dayton
to get those same decisions. And they usually come in at a lower level of interest, and a
lower dollar level." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A study on the loss of locally
owned businesses in Shreveport, Louisiana noted that "[i]t goes beyond simple giving.
Business leadership sometimes requires a level of commitment that only people with the
autonomy of a CEO can provide." Rob Gurwitt, The Rule of the Absentocracy,
GOVERNING, Sept. 1991, at 52, 56, available at http://66.23.131.98/archive/1991/sep/
cities.txt.
49. See Tolbert et al., Civic Community, supra note 40, at 94 (noting that "internal"
labor markets for managers and workers at national firms are "national and international
in scope; residential movement across communities is required for promotion").
50. See Shepard & Houghland, supra note 47, at 182; id. at 179 (finding only "slight
tendencies for absentee control to reduce likelihood of community participation when
effects of size are controlled"). "Participation" in this study meant membership in
community organizations ranging from church groups to recreational organizations. See
id. at 174 & n.25. The study apparently did not focus on the degree to which managers
held leadership positions in important community organizations, a chief concern of the
civic welfare literature. Moreover, Shepard and Houghland's findings on absentee control
are questionable because their proxy for local control was whether more than half of a
firm's employees were employed at the local plant, regardless of where the firm's
headquarters was located. See id. at 179. On the other hand, Shepard and Houghland's
finding that larger firms participate more in the community than smaller firms is
confirmed by the Harvard Business School study. See KANTER, supra note 42, at 176
(reporting that a survey of 2,655 business leaders showed that "level of community service
is overwhelmingly a function of number of employees; larger companies do more").
51. See Stan Humphreys, Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Firm: The Impact of
Economic Scale on PoliticalParticipation,45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 678, 689 (2001). Humphreys
concluded that although self-employed persons are more involved in both political and
civic activities, "[t]here is no evidence of a ripple effect of community-wide political
apathy caused by a reduction in the number of independent business owners within the
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firm that operates in a decentralized fashion, retaining local
executives and allowing them substantial discretion to be civic
leaders.5 2 But, as Carstensen and Questal noted years ago:
[E]ven where large conglomerates give local managers wide
discretion, final authority ultimately rests in the hands of a
distant, unknown few. The power to hire and fire the manager
inevitably lies in centralized control; even if ostensibly given a
free rein, the local manager, conscious of this sanction, will
shape his behavior accordingly. 3
Moreover, it is clear that in many cases the loss of corporate
headquarters has meant a loss of civic leadership.5 4
B.

CorporatePhilanthropy

Corporate philanthropy makes up a small but significant
component of charitable giving in the United States.
Insofar as
corporate philanthropy is partly a function of the social context in
which managers live and work, as the literature suggests, the transfer

community." Id. at 692. Indeed, it is possible that removal of old elites that dominate a
city's philanthropic activity may in some instances open up civic leadership to "new blood"
to the benefit of the community. See Marquis & Davis, supra note 41, at 23-24.
52. Alternatively, a locally headquartered firm could be run by a CEO that has no ties
to the community and may not even live there. See, e.g., Robert Gavin, CEO Kilts Drives
up Value of Company and Himself, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2005, at El (noting that the
CEO of Boston-based Gillette "kept a low profile in Boston" as he "kept his home in Rye,
N.Y. and spent his weekends there").
53. Peter C. Carstensen & Nina H. Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 863
(1978); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318-19 (1949) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("[Wihen independents are swallowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs
become employees of absentee owners there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local
leadership is diluted. He who was a leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders
for his action and policy.").
54. See KANTER, supra note 42, at 183 ("Some cities face a civic leadership crisis with
the loss of traditional headquarters."); see also Gurwitt, supra note 48, at 52, 54 (noting
that the process of takeovers of local firms in Shreveport "is having a profound impact on
political and civic life"); Rimer, supra note 48 (noting adverse effect on Dayton).
55. In 2005, corporations gave an estimated $13.8 billion to charitable organizations,
which is approximately 5.3% of the estimated $260 billion in total charitable contributions
in the United States. See GIVING USA FOUND., GIVING USA 2006, at 14 (2006).
However, corporate contributions account for a higher percentage of nonreligious giving
and an even higher percentage of giving to higher education and cultural institutions. See
Joseph Galaskiewicz & Michelle Sinclair Colman, Collaborations Between Corporations
and Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK

180,189 (Richard Steinberg & Walter W. Powell eds., 2d ed. 2006) (citing reports showing
that corporate contributions supply 18% of all gifts to higher education, 13.2% of gifts to
nonprofit theaters, and over 15.6% of donations to symphony orchestras).
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of control of a firm's charitable giving to distant managers as a result
of a merger is likely to affect the nature of its philanthropy.
It is widely accepted in the scholarly literature on corporate
philanthropy that managerial discretion plays a significant role in
corporate charitable giving.56 While some corporate giving is tied
closely to profit maximization (for example, contributions may be a
substitute for advertising or employee benefits),57 other giving is
motivated by management's sense of corporate social responsibility
and/or is directed toward generating goodwill on the part of

customers, employees, or other stakeholders, and it provides little
measurable benefit to the corporation.58 Support for the view that a
significant component of corporate contributions is attributable to
management discretion, rather than profit maximization, can be
found in studies demonstrating that firms with a greater degree of
managerial control are more generous than shareholder-controlled
firms. 59 The consensus in the literature is that the level of corporate
contributions neither helps nor impairs corporate performance.6 °
56. See generally Michelle Sinclair & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate-Nonprofit
Partnerships: Varieties and Covariates, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1059 (1997) (reviewing
literature).
57. See, e.g., Peter Navarro, Why Do CorporationsGive to Charity? 61 J. Bus. 65, 90
(1988) (finding that corporate contributions represent a form of advertising or quasi-fringe
benefit to employees); see also SOPHIA A. MUIRHEAD, CONFERENCE BD., THE 2005

CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS REPORT 16 (2005) ("Strategic philanthropy has led
corporations to align their contributions programs more closely with their business
missions.").
58. See Galaskiewicz & Colman, supra note 55, at 185-86; see also Michael Useem,
Market and Institutional Factors in Corporate Contributions,CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter
1988, at 77 (arguing that market and institutional considerations both influence corporate
giving). Much corporate philanthropy is justified by executives as serving the firm's
"enlightened self-interest." See Sinclair & Galaskiewicz, supra note 56, at 1064; see also
William J. Baumol, Enlightened Self-Interest and CorporatePhilanthropy, in WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL ET AL., A NEW RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY 3, 16 (1970)
("The term 'enlightened self-interest' is a euphemism which refers to a combination of
factors: the public pressures for a 'socially responsible' stance on the part of the firm, the
social conscience of management, and its hope that its own contributions will serve as an
example to others."). An alternative view is that corporate contributions are simply a
wasteful management perk. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Philanthropy,
Executives' Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147, 1160
(1997) (arguing that corporate giving often amounts to abuse of executive power); see also
Milton Friedman, Making Philanthropy Out of Obscenity, REASON, Oct. 2005, at 32, 33

(reprising critique of corporate philanthropy made in a 1970 New York Times Magazine
article and suggesting that the practice only makes sense because of "obscene tax laws").
59. See William 0. Brown, Eric Helland, & Janet Kiholm Smith, Corporate
Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=472161 (finding that firms with greater agency costs-as indicated by larger
boards of directors and lower debt-give more to charity); Bruce Seifert et al., Having,
Giving, and Getting: Slack Resources, Corporate Philanthropy, and Firm Financial
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Several scholars have documented the importance of managerial
social context to the amount of corporate charitable contributions.
For example, in an exhaustive study of philanthropy in the
Minneapolis-St. Paul area over a twenty-year period, Joseph
Galaskiewicz found that the social ties of business leaders to
philanthropic leaders were critically important in explaining the level
of charitable contributions of firms, and that companies gave more if
their top executives moved in the same social circles as charitable
leaders and other executives promoting corporate giving and
corporate social responsibility.6' Another study showed that firms
headquartered in cities with tithing clubs62 contributed significantly
more than those in cities without such clubs, indicating that managers
respond to local social expectations concerning giving. 3
The evidence suggests that managerial social context is also an
important factor in the location of corporate philanthropy. Studies
show that large companies give disproportionately to nonprofits in
their headquarters cities, rather than to operating locations. For
example, Katherine McElroy and John Siegfried found that an
average of seventy percent of a firm's contributions go to charities in

Performance, 43 BUS. & SOC'Y 135, 150 (2004) (finding that firms with more slack
resources, as indicated by relative cash flow, contribute more); Lisa Atkinson & Joseph
Galaskiewicz, Stock Ownership and Company Contributionsto Charity,33 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
82, 86 (1988) (finding that contributions decrease as stock ownership becomes more
concentrated). But see Navarro, supra note 57, at 90 (finding little relation between the
degree of managerial control and giving). Additional support for the managerial
discretion theory is said to come from studies demonstrating that corporate giving is
sensitive to changes in marginal tax rates. See James R. Boatsman & Sanjay Gupta, Taxes
and Corporate Charity: Empirical Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data,49 NAT'L TAX
J. 193, 199 (1996) (explaining that if contributions were purely profit-maximizing a change
in the marginal tax rate should have no effect on the optimal mix of contributions and
other spending).
60. See Galaskiewicz & Colman, supra note 55, at 186; Sinclair & Galaskiewicz, supra
note 56, at 1060; see also Seifert et al., supra note 59, at 141-45 (finding no effect of giving
on financial performance, and citing studies to the same effect).
61. See JOSEPH GALASKIEWICZ, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF AN URBAN GRANTS
ECONOMY: A STUDY OF BUSINESS PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

70 (1985); Joseph Galaskiewicz, An Urban Grants Economy Revisited: Corporate
Charitable Contributionsin the Twin Cities, 1979-81, 1987-89, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 445, 448
(1997) [hereinafter Galaskiewicz, Urban Grants Economy Revisited].
62. A tithing club is a local organization that promotes corporate giving by
recognizing companies that contribute a certain percentage of income to charity (typically
two to five percent). See Navarro, supra note 57, at 82.
63. Id. at 82, 86; see also Katherine Maddox McElroy & John J. Siegfried, The
Community Influence on Corporate Contributions,14 PUB. FIN. Q. 394, 407 (1986) (finding
that executives in study responded favorably to the increased expectations of giving
spawned by other firms' giving).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

the firm's headquarters city.'
According to the authors, "The
geographic distribution of contributions roughly corresponds to the
location of the executives that control the allocation ....Executives

allocate contributions not only to communities in which the firm
operates, but primarily to the communities in which they (the

executives) live."65
Managers' preference for contributions at headquarters is partly
a function of the social networks of which they are a part. McElroy
and Siegfried explain:
The

relationships

among

corporate

executives

in

a

community frequently constitute an informal social network
through which community activities are initiated. Executives
shoulder community responsibility by participating in fundraising drives and serving on the boards of directors for
philanthropic agencies, government-business task forces, local
chambers of commerce, and school boards.66

64. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 63, at 405. McElroy and Siegfried studied
the contributions in the early 1980s of 229 large companies headquartered in fourteen
metropolitan areas. Id. at 395. The favoritism toward the headquarters city could not be
explained by a greater number of employees located there because the ratio of
contributions per employee was about five times higher in the headquarters city than in
plant locations for firms that operated plants outside their headquarters. See id. at 405.
McElroy and Siegfried's findings are supported by more recent studies. For example,
Marquis and Davis concluded in their 2004 study that "corporate philanthropic giving is
[still] largely focused on the headquarters city." Marquis & Davis, supra note 41, at 15
(quoting, among others, the president of a corporate foundation for one of the largest
corporations in America, who stated that "80% of corporate spending is typically in the
headquarters city"); see also Galaskiewicz, Urban Grants Economy Revisited, supra note
61, at 454 n.4 (finding that in the late 1980s about seventy percent of the contributions of
public companies headquartered in the Twin Cities went to Twin Cities nonprofits); Hindy
Simons, Luncheon Address, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1997) (the head of J.P.
Morgan's charitable foundation noted that most of J.P. Morgan's charitable giving was
concentrated in New York City, although its business was global). But see Jane Katz, Get
Me Headquarters!,REGIONAL REV., Q4 2002, at 9, 19 (suggesting that the impact of
headquarters on philanthropy may have declined).
65. McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 63, at 405. McElroy and Siegfried found that
ninety percent of corporate contributions were directed to local, rather than national,
philanthropic organizations, and that executives at the headquarters office controlled the
allocation of eighty-seven percent of total contributions. Id.; see also John J. Siegfried et
al., Management of Corporate Contributions, 5 RES. IN CORP. PERFORMANCE & POL'Y,
87, 92 (1983) (noting that nearly all firms in survey reported that the relationship of
corporate executives to individual charities affects the allocation of funds, and that very
high level executives or the board of directors are directly involved; also stating that
"strong influence of the chief executive officer is obvious").
66. Katherine McElroy & John Siegfried, The Effect of Firm Size and Mergers on
CorporatePhilanthropy,in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 26,

at 99, 107-08.
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At the same time, headquarters-focused contributions are not
without business justification.
Indeed, Kanter maintains that
favoritism toward the headquarters locale is not just a matter of
"sentiment" but also good business:
Companies often have a larger stake in the qualities of their
headquarters city than elsewhere above and beyond the
numbers employed there (which can be small compared to
places housing production facilities) because of who comes in
and out of headquarters.... [C]ompanies need to make sure
that their home city has maximum amenities and minimum
problems in order to compete for talent in a global labor
market. Civic amenities and services are important for those
posted at headquarters, rotating through it, or visiting it for
meetings ....
Headquarters is a frequent destination for
customers or suppliers, so the home city needs to have
attractive facilities, entertainment, and transportation.67
One result of this pattern of corporate giving is that local
nonprofits receive more contributions from locally based firms than
comparably sized absentee firms. Thus, for example, the Harvard
Business School study noted above found that locally headquartered
companies contributed more to their local United Way than similar
nonlocally headquartered firms.6" Furthermore, communities with
more corporate headquarters rather than branch firms, all else equal,
have stronger nonprofit cultural sectors. A recent study of corporate
philanthropy found that the number of public companies
headquartered in a metropolitan area was a strong and significant
predictor of the number of so-called "elite" nonprofit institutions,
such as museums and other cultural institutions.6 9 Another recent

67. KANTER, supra note 42, at 179. This is a classic "enlightened self-interest"
explanation for corporate philanthropy. However, even if civic amenities benefit the firm,
it is difficult to defend contributions toward those amenities on profit-maximization
grounds because of the public-goods characteristic of the amenities. See Baumol, supra
note 58, at 16.
68. See KANTER, supra note 42, at 178-79. The locally headquartered companies

gave more themselves, and their employees gave more (on average). Id. More recently, a
survey of corporate philanthropy in Massachusetts showed that eight out of the top ten
most generous contributors of significance (measured in terms of giving per employee)
were headquartered in Massachusetts. See Patrick Lawlor, Trends: Companies with the
Highest Per-Employee Contributions,BOSTON Bus. J., Sept. 8-14, 2006, Supp. at 23.
69. See Marquis & Davis, supra note 41, at 33. The authors reviewed data from sixtytwo metropolitan areas between 1986 and 1998, and controlled for population, socioeconomic, and other factors. See id. at 25-30. They found no similar correlation for socalled "community-oriented" nonprofits, such as those devoted to housing, employment,
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study similarly concluded that the presence of corporate headquarters
leads to higher symphony orchestra budgets. 0
The "hometown" bias-in corporate philanthropy suggests that, as
a rule, local charitable contributions are likely to decline when a
locally based firm is taken over by a firm headquartered in another
city.7" While anecdotal evidence abounds to support this hypothesis,72
the only two known studies of mergers and corporate contributions
provide mixed evidence of declines in local post-merger giving.73 A

and homelessness, although only nonprofits with assets over $10 million were considered.
Id. at 36.
70. See F.M. Scherer, Corporate Structure and the Financial Support of U.S.
Symphony Orchestras 18 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 05-06, 2005), available
at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/419.pdf.
71. See Useem, supra note 58, at 84. Baumol observed this thirty-five years ago. See
Baumol, supra note 58, at 10 ("When a local firm is merged into a company that is
national or international in scope, the amount given to local non-profit institutions
typically suffers a sharp decline."). Even if giving is not reduced in absolute terms, it may
decline in the sense that it is lower than it would have been absent the merger. Thus, for
example, in an era of escalating corporate profits, local post-merger giving may increase,
but the increase may fall short of the giving that would have been expected absent the
merger. See infra note 82.
72. See, e.g., PAUL HIRSCH, PACK YOUR OWN PARACHUTE: How To SURVIVE
MERGERS, TAKEOVERS, AND OTHER CORPORATE DISASTERS 68 (1987) (noting that

after Chevron acquired Pittsburgh-based Gulf Oil, Pittsburgh lost all of Gulf's local
donations); David Greising, Special 'Presence' To Be Lost; Questions Raised on Jobs,
Philanthropy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 2004, at B1 (reporting declines in Chicago-area
contributions by BP, after acquiring Chicago-based Amoco, and by SBC, after acquiring
Chicago-based Ameritech); Michael A. Hiltzik, Charities Among Victims of L.A.
Corporate Pullouts; Business Firms' Headquarters Tend To Focus Locally, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1995, at Al (reporting significant loss of local contributions as a result of Texaco's
acquisition of Los Angeles-based Getty Oil and Bank of America's acquisition of Los
Angeles-based Security Pacific Bank).
73. Studies of mergers and corporate giving are rare apparently because data on
individual company giving are generally not publicly available. Data on giving by
corporate foundations are public, and a recent study found that acquisitions within similar
industries were correlated with increased foundation giving. See Jennifer J. Griffin,
CorporateRestructurings: Ripple Effects on CorporatePhilanthropy,4 J. PUB. AFF. 27, 35
(2004). However, the value of this study is questionable because corporate foundation
giving represents only a small portion of overall corporate giving, even among most firms
that have corporate foundations. See GIVING USA FOUND., supra note 55, at 217
(foundation giving in 2005 estimated to be less than thirty percent of total corporate
giving); MUIRHEAD, supra note 57, at 15, 32 (large company survey respondents, seventyeight percent of which had foundations, made only twenty-three percent of gifts through
foundation). Moreover, it is not clear whether the correlation found by the author means
that post-merger foundation giving for mergers in the same industry actually increased or
merely that such giving was higher for same-industry mergers than for other mergers
Finally, the baseline for the study (1997) was the high-water mark for corporate profits in
the 1990s, so a subsequent increase in foundation giving would be no surprise, as changes
in foundation giving tend to lag behind changes in corporate profits. See GIVING USA
FOUND., supra note 55, at 87, 202.
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study by the Conference Board of twenty-six mergers that were
among the most highly valued transactions of the 1990s found that the
total contributions budgets of the merged firms generally declined
post-merger.74 And while there were some instances of increased
giving (mostly in the financial services industry where maintaining
community goodwill seems particularly important)75 those increases
may not have been sustained over time.76 On the other hand, in the
McElroy and Siegfried study in the early 1980s, forty-one percent of
the firms interviewed that had recently undergone a merger
surprisingly reported that the acquisition increased contributions in
the previous headquarters city.77 While headquarters bias generally
suggests reduced local post-merger giving, there may be other factors
at work that can result in increased local giving in some mergers.
According to McElroy and Siegfried, the reason for the increased
giving reported in their survey is that "most mergers involve a large
firm with a substantial, systematic contributions program that
acquires a smaller firm with a small, unstructured contributions
history. 7 T8 A smaller, acquired firm may have a less generous
contributions policy toward its home community than a larger,
74. See MUIRHEAD & TILMAN, supra note 30, at 12; see also id. at 36 (noting a
"national trend of reduced post-merger giving"). While the study does not explicitly
address where the budget cuts were made, it seems implicit that cuts were made in the
giving by the acquired company although the merged firm may rationalize its entire giving
program.
75. See id. at 12 (noting that banks and other financial institutions depend heavily on
consumers in local communities).
76. The Conference Board study did not examine whether any of the increases in
giving persisted. Press reports suggest that at least some of the instances of increased (or
stable) giving were not sustained. See Greising, supra note 72 (reporting that BP and SBC
failed to deliver on early promises to sustain pre-merger levels of local giving); Holly Hall,
Globalization Could Erode Corporate Giving in U.S., Expert Warns, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, July 22, 2004, at 17, 18 (president of the Lucent Technologies
Foundation stated that, after a merger, " 'overall giving stays flat or goes down. Even
when they promise the same or more money, it's only for the short term,'" citing
Honeywell's performance after merger with Allied Signal and relocation of headquarters
from Minneapolis to New Jersey); see also Bailey, supra note 3 (former CEO of State
Street Bank, commenting on sale of FleetBoston to Bank of America, stated that "[o]ver
time, these kind of things have a devastating effect on a community, even though they
make commitments to maintain things in the short term").
77. McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 66, at 126. The authors received an evaluation
for 115 merger cases; twenty-one percent reported decreased contributions, and thirtyeight percent reported no change in contributions. Id. No specific data were provided by
the interview subjects, nor did the authors attempt to verify the reports, although they had
no reason to doubt the information. See E-mail from John Siegfried, Professor of
Economics, Vanderbilt University, to Richard Brunell (Aug. 16, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
78. McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 66, at 126.
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acquiring firm has toward its operating locations because, for
example, the larger firm may contribute a higher percentage of its
profits to charity or may simply be more profitable.7 9
Still, additional evidence points generally toward lower postmerger giving. Studies have uniformly found that the amount of
corporate giving varies with profits, but that the income elasticity of
large-firm giving is less than one.80 In other words, giving tends not to
increase (or decrease) proportionately with changes in profits. All
else equal, this suggests that mergers of equally generous firms are
likely to result in lower overall giving"1 and thus supports the
conclusion that mergers on balance are likely to reduce corporate
contributions to the acquired firm's community.82 To be sure, even if
79. See id. at 129.
80. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 63, at 403 (finding that contributions of large
firms increase or decrease by about 0.75% when profits increase or decrease by one
percent); Boatsman & Gupta, supra note 59, at 206 (finding relatively low incomeelasticity of contributions); Robert Carroll & David Joulfaian, Taxes and Corporate
Giving to Charity, 33 PUB. FIN. REV. 300, 311 (2005) (finding income elasticity of 0.65);
Peter Navarro, The Income Elasticity of Corporate Contributions, 28 Q. REV. ECON. &
Bus. 66 (1988) (finding that contributions are moderately income-inelastic); see also
McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 66, at 101 (showing that medium-sized firms, measured in
terms of asset size, tend to contribute a higher percentage of their net income than either
small firms or large firms).
81. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 66, at 132. This would not apply to acquiring
firms that are committed to contributing a fixed percentage of profits to charity, as some
are. See, e.g., Whole Foods Market, Community Giving, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.
com/company/communitygiving.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (explaining company's
commitment to contribute at least five percent of annual net profits to charity).
82. Consider the scenario in which the acquiring and acquired firms each have income
before taxes of $100 million and each contributes $1 million (one percent of pretax
income) to charity, for a combined total of $2 million. If the income elasticity of giving is
0.75, then the merged firm will contribute only $1.75 million after the merger. If one
assumes for purposes of illustration that half of the merged firm's contributions are
allocated to the acquired firm's home community (ignoring the hometown-bias factor),
then contributions to the acquired firm's community will decline post-merger from $1
million to $875,000. To be sure, if profits increase following the merger, then post-merger
giving could increase, even as giving as a percentage income declines. Thus, in the
example, if income after the merger grows by twenty percent (from $200 to $240 million),
post-merger giving would thereby increase to $2.05 million (with the acquiring firm's
community receiving an assumed half of the contributions, or $1.025 million), while the
merged firm's contributions as a percentage of income would decline from 1% to 0.85%.
However, if the acquired firm's earnings would have increased by twenty percent without
the merger, then it would have contributed even more ($1.15 million) had it not been
acquired. Interestingly, Bank of America's charitable giving following its acquisition of
FleetBoston is consistent with this pattern. Prior to the merger (between 1999 and 2003),
each bank contributed about 0.7% of its pretax income to charity, with the combined
giving reaching roughly $105 million in 2003, according to annual surveys conducted by the
Chronicle of Philanthropy and the firms' annual reports. See Chronicle of Philanthropy,
Gifts and Grants: Charitable Giving at Major Corporations, http:l/philanthropy.com/2006
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contributions by the merged firm to the acquired firm's community
decline, it is possible that such a decline could be offset by increased
personal contributions of local owners who have sold out.83 But this
does not appear to be a common scenario.
C.

Employment, Investment, and Plant Closings

Corporate headquarters have been described as the "prized
pelts" of city economic development.' 4 Bill Testa, an economist with
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and his colleagues explain why
this is so:
For one, [headquarters] enhance a city's economic strength and
image. A city that is the location of big name corporations will
find it easier to attract potential investors. For another,
[headquarters] often rely on high level business services-many
of which may be purchased locally, thereby creating jobs and
income. In addition, the jobs of [headquarters] workers are
typically of the highly skilled and highly compensated variety.
[And headquarters] employees may be corporate leaders who
are active in civic and philanthropic affairs.85
The literature suggests that the loss of a corporate headquarters
has both short- and long-run adverse effects on employment levels in
the local community. In the short run, of course, headquarters jobs
are lost, and local firms that provided services to the headquarters

(e.g., lawyers, accountants, and consultants) commonly lose business.
In the long run, the loss of local control may also reduce employment

(last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (subscription required) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review). In the first full year after the merger (2005), contributions had climbed in
absolute terms to $130 million but dropped to 0.53% of pretax income. See BANK OF AM.
CORP., 2005 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2005); Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report

(Form 10-K), at 14 (Dec. 31, 2005); cf. Sasha Talcott, Bank of America Corp. Increases
N.E. Donations, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 2006, at Al (reporting that Bank of America's
donations in Massachusetts and New England increased between 2003 and 2005, but that
other big banks in Massachusetts had comparable or greater percentage increases in their
Massachusetts donations).
83. See Alan J. Borsuk, Sales of Businesses a Boon for Giving; State Foundations'
Assets Jump 16% in One Year, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 2000, at B1 (noting
gains in Milwaukee philanthropy as a result of sales of privately held local companies, such
as the sale of the Allen-Bradley Co. to Rockwell International); Scherer, supra note 70, at
10. Furthermore, it should be noted that the income-elasticity data suggest that mergers of
firms whose headquarters are in the same city may also lead to a reduction in local giving.
Cf MUIRHEAD & TILMAN, supra note 30, at 8 (noting that "merging companies in the
same region often support the same organizations, and so are likely to trim any overlap").
84. Testa et al., supra note 15, at 1.
85. Id.
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at local production facilities, lower investment in new facilities, or
make disinvestment by the firm more likely.8 6 Stern and Aldrich
surveyed the literature some twenty-five years ago and concluded

that "explicit studies of the effects of absentee ownership on plant
closures and job creation provide relatively clear results," namely,
that absentee ownership results in reduced employment.8 7

For

example, two studies (in different states) showed that mergers
between locally owned and conglomerate corporations significantly

decreased (on average) the rates of growth in employment and
payroll of the acquired local firms and that use of nonlocal financial,
legal, and accounting services produced direct revenue losses to the

community. 88 Two other studies cited by Stern and Aldrich, not
involving mergers, showed higher rates of employment growth among
locally owned firms than at comparable absentee-owned firms.89

More recent studies examining the effects of mergers on employment
are suggestive, but they do not focus explicitly on the issue of local

control. 90
86. The loss of a corporate headquarters not only has a direct and indirect effect on
employment levels in a community but also may impair the productivity of remaining
firms as a result of the loss of "agglomeration economies"-that is, spillovers that result
from the presence of multiple corporate headquarters in the same geographic region. See,
e.g., Teresa Garcia-Mil & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the City, 2002
BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFF. 95, 114 (suggesting that communities
desire headquarters because they increase productivity of existing firms). See generally
Stuart S. Rosenthal & William C. Strange, Evidence on the Nature and Source of
Agglomeration Economies, in 4 HANDBOOK OF URBAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMICS:
CITIES AND GEOGRAPHY 2119 (J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques F. Thisse eds., 2004)

(reviewing empirical literature on agglomeration economies).
87. Stern & Aldrich, supra note 47, at 168.
88. See id. (discussing Wisconsin and Nebraska studies).
89. See id. The evidence is somewhat equivocal as to whether national, multi-plant
firms invest more in their headquarters locale than elsewhere. See Roger W. Schmenner,
Aspects of Industrial Plant Openings and Closings, in THE IMPACT OF THE MODERN
CORPORATION, supra note 26, at 191, 206 (concluding from a study of large
manufacturers in the 1970s that data did not support the hypothesis that a corporation
favors communities around its home base in terms of production capacity increases or
decreases, but smaller companies with fewer plants were less likely than larger companies
to close a plant near headquarters).
90. For example, Lichtenberg and Siegel, reviewing census data from 1977 to 1982,
found that "auxiliary establishments" (nonproduction facilities) that changed ownership
had significantly lower employment growth (indeed sharp employment declines) and
lower wage growth than those that had not changed control. Frank R. Lichtenberg &
Donald Siegel, The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central
Office and Other Personnel, 33 J.L. & ECON. 383, 395 (1990). A different study of the
period from 1977 to 1987 found that production facilities of average size that had been
acquired had higher employment growth and wages, although large plants (which account
for most production workers) that had been acquired had lower wages and employment
growth than plants that did not change ownership. Robert H. McGuckin & Sang V.
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A firm may favor investment, employment, or service providers
located at its headquarters, rather than at distant locales, for a
number of reasons. Monitoring costs may be lower for operations
near headquarters, or there may be other economies of scope
between headquarters and local operations. 9
Headquarters'
proximity to local services (or other suppliers) has obvious
advantages. 92 For firms that operate principally in a single locale or
region, there are additional reasons that make it more likely to add
production capacity and less likely to disinvest locally than would a
branch of a multi-location firm. The multi-location firm is more
mobile and less dependent on any single location; its investment
horizon will be geographically wider. It is less likely to add capacity
to any particular location than a single-locale firm, which presumably
will add capacity locally until it faces significant diseconomies of
scale. 93 A single-locale firm is also less likely to close its plant(s) than
a firm operating in multiple locales insofar as disinvestment amounts
to closure of the firm (and inability to recover costs) and is less likely
to relocate its plants because of its greater dependence on the locality
and higher transaction costs of relocating.9 4 As a result of its lessened

Nguyen, The Impact of Ownership Changes: A View from Labor Markets, 19 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 739, 757-60 (2001); see also Klaus Gugler & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, The Effects
of Mergers on Company Employment in the USA and Europe, 22 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG.
481, 498 (2004) (study of mergers between 1981 and 1998 found no significant adverse
effects of mergers on labor demand in the U.S., on average, but found lower employment
when the merger was accomplished by tender offer).
91. See Testa et al., supra note 15, at 2 (noting the importance of headquarters
proximity to production activities "for the purposes of monitoring, evaluating, and
coordinating these activities").
92. See id. at 3 (noting that contact with providers of support services often needs to
be face to face).
93. See KANTER, supra note 42, at 180 ("Employment growth begins first at home,
then other sites are established.").
94. See Clifford Kono et al., Lost in Space: The Geography of Corporate Interlocking
Directorates,4 AM. J. SOC. 863, 872 (1998) ("Corporations embedded in geographically
expansive financial and non-financial markets possess locational flexibility....
In
particular, the more locations in which corporations produce, the better positioned they
are to shift production outside their headquarters location, either by downsizing and
transferring personnel or by closing and relocating entire plants."). There may be
countervailing factors that would lead a diversified firm to be more likely to keep an
unprofitable plant open than a local firm. For example, if the product produced at a local
plant is a complement to the firm's other business, it may be more costly for the diversified
firm to shut the plant down. See Richard E. Caves & Michael E. Porter, Barriersto Exit,
in ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN HONOR OF JOE S. BAIN 39, 41-42 (Robert
T. Masson & P. David Quails eds., 1976).
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mobility, the single-locale firm also may be less able to extract tax and
other concessions from local communities. 95
The tendency toward greater long-run investment and
employment by locally controlled firms may also be explained in part

by a managerial discretion theory. The same personal attachment
that leads managers to become civic leaders and direct corporate

charitable contributions to their communities suggests that, insofar as
managers have discretionary authority with respect to investment and
employment decisions, they will favor their local communities over

distant ones. At the margin, managers will prefer to direct the
spillover benefits (or avoid the spillover costs) of employment and
investment decisions to their home communities.
Moreover,
managers' personal stakes and social relationships in the community

may lead them to sacrifice some degree of corporate profits to benefit
(or avoid harming) that community, for example by keeping a
marginally profitable plant open. 96

In sum, the literature suggests that mergers that involve the loss
of local control are likely to have adverse economic effects on the

community losing the corporate headquarters not merely because of
immediate job cuts associated with the elimination of the
headquarters, but also over the long term as a result of the change in
the locus of control of the corporation. Can the losses be quantified?
Perhaps some indication of the value of a corporate headquarters
can be gleaned from the tax incentives and other subsidies that some
state and local governments have provided to companies to relocate
their headquarters. 97 In the most prominent example, Boeing moved
its corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago in 2001 after

95. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377. 397 (1996)
(criticizing interstate competition to reduce taxes on mobile businesses); cf Brett Arneds,
Whiny Kilts Puts Boston on Notice, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 9, 2005, at 5 (reporting that
James Kilts, outgoing CEO of Boston-based Gillette who engineered takeover by Procter
& Gamble, warned that Massachusetts needed to change its attitude now that Procter &
Gamble "is trying to decide if Massachusetts is a place where they want to expand and
invest" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
96. See, e.g., Tolbert et al., Civic Community, supra note 40, at 93 ("As a result of
their strong and enduring community ties, [small, local firms] may be less likely to pull out
of the community during an economic downturn.
); Berg & Shack-Marquez, supra
note 45, at 220 (same).
97. Of course, such subsidies only reflect the actual public benefits of a corporate
headquarters to the extent that public officials accurately assess those benefits and are
motivated by a desire to advance the public interest, which may not always be the case.
See Enrich, supra note 95, at 393-96 (suggesting that business location tax incentives are
driven more by politics than a cost-benefit analysis).
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receiving a package of $56 million in subsidies from the State of
Illinois and the city of Chicago.9 8 Other recent examples include
Tennessee providing $197 million in incentives to lure Nissan's North
American headquarters to the Nashville area from California99 and
$15 million in tax breaks to attract International Paper's international
headquarters to Memphis from Connecticut. 00 In fact, these figures
represent only a small fraction of the economic gain anticipated by
state and local officials.01 ' All other things being equal, one would
expect that the economic loss to a community from losing a
headquarters would be at least as high as the gains from acquiring
one. 102
98. See JEFF MCCOURT ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST: A BETTFER DEAL FOR ILLINOIS:
57-58
(2003), available at
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
POLICY

IMPROVING

http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/il.pdf. About $30 million of the package consisted of tax
breaks and grants provided by the State of Illinois, and the rest was provided by the city of
Chicago; most of the tax breaks were to be paid over time. Id. Chicago beat out Denver
and Dallas-Fort Worth as finalists in an unusually public site-location auction after Boeing
had decided to move from Seattle. Id. Interestingly, many local leaders that supported
the subsidy did not focus on the direct employment gains, which were expected to be
modest (400 to 500 jobs, most of which were not expected to be filled locally). See Mellisa
Allison, Despite Tough Year, Boeing, City Blend Well, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2002, at C1.
Rather, local leaders were interested in the more intangible benefits, such as prestige,
philanthropy, and lure for other investment. See John Smeltzer, Aerospace Giant Wraps
Up 3-City Spectacle; Move Set for Summer, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2001, at N1; Editorial,
What Boeing Gives-And Gets, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2001, at N28; see also Corporate
Headquarters Relocation Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 611/5 (West 2006) (purpose of
statute authorizing subsidies is that relocations of corporate headquarters to Illinois "will
foster a positive image of the State of Illinois and its human and natural resources
throughout the United States and the world; contribute to a strong residential housing
market; directly and indirectly create jobs and additional taxes within the State; encourage
the relocation of other similar businesses to the State; and otherwise foster the
development of commerce and industry within the State of Illinois").
99. See Alan Ohnsman, Nissan To Get $197 Min in Incentives from Tennessee,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 7, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000101
&sid=aaPsSYRM78K4&refer=japan (quoting director of research center at University of
Tennessee as stating that the "opportunity to get a large, very well-paying, visible
headquarters helps the state's image").
100. Amos Maki, IP To Make It Official. HQ Coming-94 Executive Jobs 'Huge for
City,' COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 16, 2005, at Al (reporting that although
headquarters would bring only ninety-four executive jobs, the "relocation could become a
marketing and recruiting bonanza for the city, signaling to the nation's top executives that
Memphis is a place to do business").
101. See, e.g., MCCOURT ET AL., supra note 98, at 63-64 (reporting that Illinois officials
relied on Arthur Anderson study that claimed the area economy would gain $4.5 billion
over twenty years from Boeing relocation, but arguing that such claims were inflated);
Ohnsman, supra note 99 (stating Tennessee officials expected a payoff of several times the
investment).
102. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing endowment effect). Of
course, the costs and benefits of losing or acquiring a major corporate headquarters in a
relocation may vary depending on the needs of the affected communities. In the examples
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D. Local Control and Social Welfare

Even if one is convinced that the loss of local control has adverse
effects on a community losing a corporate headquarters, one might
ask whether the transfer of control to distant management "merely"
transfers wealth from the local community to the headquarters city of
the acquiring firm (or from the local community to shareholders) and,
if so, whether such wealth transfers harm social welfare. The short
answer is that while the relocation of a corporate headquarters (as in
the Boeing example) may amount to a pure transfer between cities,
the elimination of a headquarters through merger is likely to be less
than a zero-sum game.
The empirical evidence on the effect of mergers on the
headquarters city of the acquiring firm is sparse, so the analysis must
necessarily be somewhat tentative, but there are reasons to believe
that, in significant respects, the losses to the community losing its
corporate headquarters are not likely to be offset by gains to the
acquiring company's headquarters city. In terms of civic leadership,
for example, the managers of the acquiring firm are unlikely to
become more engaged in their own headquarters community as a
result of acquiring a distant firm; on the contrary, their local
engagement may decline as their corporate empire expands to new
lands. 3 Insofar as the managers of the acquired local firm who are
active civic leaders in the community are transferred to the new
headquarters, their transfer is unlikely to benefit their new
community much, at least in the short run, because their attachment
to the new locale will be weak and, as newcomers, they will lack local
clout.

14

cited, the states losing the headquarters either did not participate in the bidding process at
all (in the case of Boeing and International Paper) or bowed out (in the case of Nissan)
because the company had made the decision to relocate elsewhere. See supra notes 98101 and accompanying text; Michael Gardner, Governor Offered Nissan Incentives, DAILY
BREEZE (L.A., Cal.), Nov. 11, 2005, at A13.
103. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE

289 (1984) ("[T]he existence of distant subsidiaries will weaken management's attachment
to the home base-and its commitment to it and its work force in times of economic
adversity.").
104. Of course, the more deeply rooted the managers of the acquired company are in
their local community, the less likely they are to move to the headquarters of the acquired
firm. And it is not uncommon for such moves to be temporary in any event. See Jay C.
Hartzell et al., What's in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REv. FIN. STUD.

37, 49 (2004) (presenting study of several hundred mergers in late 1990s that shows
"extremely high" turnover rate for CEOs of a target company who become executives of
the parent after the merger).
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It is more plausible perhaps that the acquiring firm's
headquarters city would experience some gain in charitable donations
as a result of a merger. If the level of corporate charitable giving is
largely a function of profits, and firms allocate a disproportionate
share of their donations to their headquarters city, as indicated
above,105 then one might expect an acquisition to lead to greater
donations in the acquiring firm's headquarters city while reducing
contributions in the headquarters city of the acquired firm-a net
wash if the merging firms were equally generous pre-merger.
However, as noted above, data on the income-elasticity of giving
suggest that a merger of equally generous firms would likely lead to a
reduction in overall giving, all other things being equal. 106 Further,
since large firms contribute a lower percentage of their income than
medium-sized firms, 107 one would expect that the acquisition of a
medium-sized firm by a large firm would also tend to reduce the
overall amount given.'018
Of course, a reduction in corporate
philanthropy may well benefit shareholders, as opponents of
corporate philanthropy contend," 9 but such a transfer seems unlikely
to enhance social welfare. 110

105. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
107. See McElroy & Siegfried, supra note 66, at 101.
108. Two caveats on the general tendency of mergers to reduce corporate charitable
giving deserve mention. First, to the extent that a merger enables the firms to increase
their profitability, post-merger giving could increase even if the rate of giving (as a
percentage of profits) declines. See supra note 82 (providing a numerical example).
Second, a reduction in corporate giving could be offset to some extent by increased
individual giving not only, as noted above, when the acquired firm is privately held and the
acquisition provides the selling owners with the opportunity to make large personal gifts,
see supra note 83 and accompanying text, but also when widely dispersed shareholders of
the acquired company respond to their increased wealth by increasing their individual
charitable donations. See, e.g., Partha Deb et al., Estimating Charitable Deductions in
Giving USA, 32 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 548, 554 (2003) (finding that
individual giving is responsive to changes in stock market wealth). But these possibilities
would seem to be particularly exceptional in light of the evidence that mergers on the
whole do not tend to increase firm profitability or net shareholder wealth. See supra note
29.
109. See Friedman, supra note 58, at 33. Indeed, the premium paid to the acquired
company's shareholders may reflect, in part, the capitalized value of an anticipated
reduction in contributions. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the level of
charitable giving affects firm performance. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
110. A transfer of wealth from charitable organizations to shareholders presumably
would reduce social welfare on distributive grounds or on the premise that the services or
benefits supported by the contributions are public goods that are underproduced. See
Baumol, supra note 58, at 15-18; see also Elhauge, supra note 14, at 838 (arguing that
corporate donations improve social welfare because managers are subject to social and
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In terms of employment and investment, it seems clear that some
types of job losses that the acquired firm's community experiences
will be offset by job gains for the headquarters city of the acquiring
firm. For example, the service providers and other vendors that
previously serviced the acquired firm may simply be replaced by the
acquiring firm's service providers and vendors. To the extent that
internal overhead functions of the acquired firm are switched to the
acquiring firm's headquarters, the new headquarters city will gain.
Or, if such functions are eliminated (because duplicative), then costs
will be lowered, which presumably benefits shareholders, consumers,
or both. Similarly, if production is shifted away from the acquired
firm's headquarters to other locales, the other locales benefit. And if
production is not shifted but is eliminated entirely, and a plant is
closed that would have remained open under local control, then
shareholders, if not consumers, presumably gain. However, some of
the indirect economic costs of losing a corporate headquarters-such
as the loss of prestige for the city and the spillovers enjoyed by other
firms-are not likely to be offset. It seems implausible that the
acquiring firm's headquarters city improves its image much or obtains
additional spillovers when the firm makes an acquisition.
Moreover, even if the costs to the community losing a
headquarters were offset by equivalent gains to the headquarters
community of the acquiring firm, there is reason to think that the
transfer of such wealth may reduce social welfare, assuming no
productive efficiency gains from the acquisition. The simple reason is
that people are loss-averse; that is, they are more sensitive to losses in
wealth than they are to gains.'1 ' Therefore, the social value of
existing jobs or philanthropic programs to the community losing a
headquarters is likely "worth more" than the value of new jobs or
programs created elsewhere, all other things being equal."2 This
moral processes connected to the business operation from which shareholders are
insulated).
111. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (offering a seminal analysis of
the endowment effect); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) (demonstrating how endowment effect can be incorporated
into legal policy analysis in a variety of areas).
112. See Korobkin, supra note 111, at 1277 ("The endowment effect suggests that an
employee will probably value a job that she has more than a job that she does not have.").
Of course, if the acquiring firm were headquartered in a depressed area and the acquired
firm were located in a thriving area, then social welfare may be advanced by a transfer of
wealth to the depressed community. However, the movement of corporate headquarters
seems to be in the opposite direction. See generally Thomas Klier & William Testa,
Location Trends of Large Company Headquarters During the 1990s, ECON. PERSP.,
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phenomenon is compounded by the dislocation effects of losses, e.g.,
the costs of unemployment or the costs of replacing a big client or
donor (if replaceable at all). Indeed, if the local community is
particularly dependent on the local firm-for example because the
firm is large and the community small-then the dislocation effects
can be substantial, as studies of plant closings have demonstrated.113
In sum, even if the loss of local control "merely" transfers wealth
from one community to another, it seems likely to reduce social
welfare-at least absent other gains in efficiency from the acquisition.
But the analysis here suggests that the loss of local control may
destroy social wealth. At the very least, given the potential negative
external effects on local communities, one could not conclude that
merely because a merger increases shareholder value, if it does,"' it
advances social welfare." 5 On the contrary, the external effects
suggest a potential classic market failure. 16
2Q/2000, at 12, 20 (noting that during the 1990s the Northeast and Midwest regions lost
headquarters while the South gained).
113. See,
e.g.,
BENNETT
HARRISON
&
BARRY
BLUESTONE,
THE
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 67 (1982) (explaining that effects of plant closing
can include: direct losses to the employees that lose jobs, suppliers that lose contracts, and
governments that lose corporate income and property tax revenue; secondary shocks
including decreased retail purchases in a community, reduction of earnings at supplier
plants, and increased unemployment in other sectors; and tertiary effects, including
increased demand for public services, reduced personal tax receipts, and layoffs in other
industries).
114. See supra note 29 (citing studies showing that mergers in the aggregate may
reduce net shareholder value).
115. During the era of hostile takeovers in the 1980s, some economists and corporate
law scholars emphasized that takeover premiums may not reflect real gains in social
wealth in part because of the negative externalities associated with such takeovers. See
Coffee, supra note 23, at 447-48 (exploring a possible divergence between shareholder
wealth and social wealth in hostile takeovers); Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers,
Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 33, 44 (Alan J.Auerbach ed., 1988) (arguing that hostile takeovers may
be inefficient ex post insofar as the takeover premium reflects redistribution of wealth
from stakeholders to shareholders and fails to account for other external effects). More
generally, critics of the "efficient market hypothesis" have explored myriad ways that
takeover premiums may not reflect real gains. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in
the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning That Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60
BUS. LAW. 1435, 1439-44 (2005).
116. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183 (4th ed. 1962)
(providing a classic definition of externality). Because the external effects on the
community losing control are diffuse and widespread, bargaining is not feasible and the
unregulated market will not necessarily lead to an efficient result. See Schleifer &
Summers, supra note 115, at 44 (noting the collective action problem of a community
bargaining with a firm not to shut down a plant); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, FirmSpecific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of FundamentalCorporate Changes,
1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 197 (recognizing that "[tihose outside the web of contracts that make
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The legal and economic scholarship that emphasizes the
significance of trust in enhancing economic efficiency suggests an
additional reason why the loss of local control may be inefficient." 7
The commitment of a locally controlled firm to the community builds
trust among community stakeholders, which can have important
benefits to the firm. For example, it may lead state and local public
officials to use their political and regulatory influence on behalf of the
firm, perhaps by supporting a desired merger..8 or fending off a
hostile one.119 Or, by indicating that the firm is less likely to pull up
stakes in times of economic adversity, local control may lead
community stakeholders to make investments that they would
otherwise be reluctant to make. Suppliers or other vendors may be
more willing to build facilities to serve the firm, or employees may be
more willing to develop firm-specific skills that could not be
recovered if the firm were to move operations out of town. Other
companies that have no direct economic relationship at all with the
firm may be more willing to invest in the community (and thereby
indirectly benefit the firm and its employees) if they believe that the
firm is committed to the community for the long haul. In short, local
control may signal that the firm will not act opportunistically and take
advantage of stakeholders' investments when it no longer suits the
firm; it engenders trust, which brings forth investment that benefits all
concerned. 12 0
up modern, publicly held firms," such as community groups, "may be in a weaker position

to protect themselves from exploitation than" employees and other stakeholders). To be
sure, state and local governments might stand in for the community and try to bribe a local

firm not to sell out, just as they sometimes offer tax breaks to firms to attract a corporate
headquarters. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. However, political and
social constraints would likely limit the ability of state and local governments to pay a firm
not to engage in what many would consider to be a breach of trust with community
stakeholders. See infra note 121.
117. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1753-54 (2001)

(arguing that internalized trust plays a critical, but underappreciated, role in the business
corporation); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 115, at 38.
118. See, e.g., FLEETJBANKBOSTON HEARING, supra note 7, at 65 (Massachusetts

Senator John Kerry, a member of the Senate Banking Committee, testifying in support of
the Fleet/BankBoston merger so that "Boston remains a hub of financial services in the
new century and that New England-based banks continue to be available to depositors in
New England").
119. See infra note 208 (discussing State efforts to prevent the hostile takeover of
Stanley Works).
120. This notion is similar to the idea behind the "team production model" of

corporate law, which posits that efficiency is enhanced when a public corporation (more
specifically, its board of directors) is viewed as a "mediating hierarchy" that maximizes the
collective interests of all stakeholders, not merely shareholders. See Margaret M. Blair &

2006]

SOCIAL COSTS OF MERGERS

The loss, then, when a locally controlled firm is acquired by a
distant firm includes the loss of trust of community stakeholders
engendered by local control and the loss of investment and other
benefits that accrue to a firm that has built up trust in the
community.' 2 ' The acquiring firm may not recognize community trust
as a valuable asset, or it may be prepared to jettison this asset in
pursuit of other objectives, but it does so at a cost. To be sure, the
acquiring firm could seek to demonstrate its commitment to the
community in other ways-for example, by maintaining or even
boosting its local philanthropy for a period of time. 2 2 But such
in
gestures are unlikely to be able to substitute for the active presence
23
years.'
many
over
managers
corporate
top
of
the community
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250-51
(1999). This conception of the board encourages stakeholders to make firm-specific
investments that otherwise would not be made (or that would be more costly for the firm
to obtain) because of the stakeholders' fear of opportunistic behavior by shareholders to
capture rents enabled by such investments. The key to this theory is the difficulty or
impossibility of generating the optimal level of firm-specific investments by stakeholders
through explicit contracts. Notably, the stakeholder least able to contract with the firm is
probably the community. See supra note 116. Through the lens of the team production
model, one might view local control as demonstrating a commitment by the firm to
advance community stakeholder interests at the possible expense of short-term
shareholder gain.
121. Hirsch notes that takeovers have reduced the loyalty ties between corporations
and the communities in which they do business. See HIRSCH, supra note 72, at 66. For
example, he describes the consequences when United Technologies acquired Otis
Elevator Corp. in 1982 and a "century-long relationship based on mutual trust, traditional
goodwill, and a handshake was destroyed." Id. at 67. According to Hirsch:
Otis had been based in Yonkers since 1853, but after the takeover, United
Technologies announced Otis would leave Yonkers. The recently opened Otis
plant, built on land bought with public money and employing 1,800 workers, was
shut down. The city's mayor, naturally concerned about the community impact of
the surprise relocation, was indignant about the decision and still told interviewers
three years later of the city's "rape" and "absolute betrayal" by the company's
takeover and disappearance.
Id.
122. Of course, insofar as a company increases its charitable giving post-merger in
order to maintain community goodwill, the increased giving itself may be considered a cost
of eliminating local control.
123. Two apparent paradoxes in a friendly takeover deserve comment. First, if the
locally controlled firm voluntarily cedes local control, how can local control be viewed ex
ante as a commitment to the community? The answer is that local control is not an
absolute guarantee of community commitment but is rather a strong indicator, and the fact
that the indicator is losing its force may itself be a social loss. Cf. Schleifer & Summers,
supra note 115, at 46 (noting that widespread breach of implicit contracts may undermine
trust and the ability of firms generally to engage in implicit contracting). Second, if
managers-because they are embedded in a local social network-use their managerial
discretion to benefit the local community, then why, one might ask, don't they refuse to
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Finally, the burgeoning legal literature on efficiency and social

norms offers a broader rationale for thinking that the loss of local
control may impair efficiency. 12 4

A number of scholars have

emphasized that social and moral sanctions are important in
promoting efficiency because of the limitations of legal and economic

sanctions in controlling behavior.2

5

Following this premise, Professor

Elhauge has recently defended the notion that corporate managers
should be free to respond to social norms, even at the expense of

maximizing profits for shareholders, because responsiveness to social

norms enhances social efficiency.'2 6 If corporate headquarters are the
incubators and transmitters of positive social norms to managers

(because that is where top managers may be embedded in social
networks)' 2 7 it follows that reducing the number of corporate

headquarters from which control of business is exercised (i.e.,

sell their company to a distant firm in a friendly takeover? The answer, at least as to
public companies, is that managerial discretion is not unlimited, and shareholder primacy
may come to the fore when shareholders are offered a substantial premium for their
shares. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 808-10 (discussing ways in which various market
forces limit the ability of managers to sacrifice profits in the public interest); see also
Cassidy, supra note 1 and accompanying text. Moreover, managerial regard for
community welfare may be sublimated in the face of large personal payoffs. See Hartzell
et al., supra note 104, at 38-39 (finding that target CEOs earned an average of $8 to $12
million from large acquisitions in the late 1990s, not including benefits from any postmerger position at the acquiring company); Gretchen Morgenson, No Wonder C.E.O.'s
Love Those Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at 3 (reporting that chief executives of
acquired firms like mergers because their severance agreements kick in, and "that means
they can become truly, titanically, stupefyingly rich"); see also Charles Forelle & Mark
Maremont, Gillette CEO Payday May Be Richer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2005, at B2
(reporting that the CEO of Gillette, James Kilts, was to receive an estimated $185 million
upon Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Gillette).
124. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms,
27 J. LEG. STUD. 537 (1998) (reviewing literature).
125. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 754 ("Social and moral sanctions have a regulatory
advantage when those imposing them are better informed about the situation and
particular actors can act in a more contextual way with lower procedural costs."); see also
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 630-32 (2004)

(asserting a similar proposition).
126. See Elhauge, supra note 14, at 797-805. Elhauge argues that if managers were
relegated simply to maximizing shareholder welfare, they would be less responsive to
social norms than noncorporate actors because shareholders themselves (particularly in
public corporations) are relatively immune from social pressures, lack information about
the effect of corporate actions on third parties, and face collective action problems in
acting on their social or moral impulses. See id. at 798-801. Elhauge thus refutes the
arguments of advocates of shareholder primacy who maintain that corporations should
stick to maximizing shareholder gain subject only to constraints imposed by
(noncorporate) law.
127. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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increasing economic concentration)1 8 may limit the extent to which
positive social norms influence managerial behavior and thus impair
social efficiency.
From the perspective of corporate social
responsibility, reducing the number of corporate headquarters may
be harmful because it reduces the extent to which managers' roots to
local communities may leaven managers' drive to maximize profits at
129
the expense of stakeholders.
1I.

IS THE Loss OF LOCAL CONTROL A LEGITIMATE ANTITRUST
CONSIDERATION?

The loss of local control of a firm through merger, and its
potential deleterious effects on local communities, is not currently
considered a relevant consideration in merger analysis. Rather, local
control is supposedly a "noneconomic" value, which has no place in
modern antitrust doctrine. 3 ° However, the loss of local control of
128. Whether there is presently a trend toward increased concentration in the economy
is not entirely clear. While large-company headquarters are lost through mergers,
significant headquarters may be created by divestitures or the growth of small firms. Data
indicate that there has been an increase in concentration of manufacturing in the United
States in the last twenty-five years, as measured by the share of manufacturing assets
controlled by the largest firms.
See Paul A. Pautler, Evidence on Mergers and
Acquisitions, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 119, 214 (2003) (indicating that top 200 firms
accounted for 56.7% of assets in 1974 and 63.5% of assets in 2001); E-mail from F.M.
Scherer, Professor of Public Policy Emeritus, Harvard University, to Richard M. Brunell
(Aug. 7, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (share of manufacturing
assets accounted for by Fortune 500 manufacturers rose from 75.6% in 1982 to 93.1% in
2002). Other measures of concentration show declines, at least through the late 1990s. See
Pautler, supra, at 215 (showing that the aggregate concentration of top manufacturers as
measured by value added declined slightly between 1977 and 1997); Lawrence J. White,
Trends in Aggregate Concentration in the United States, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 155-56
(2002) (finding declines in aggregate concentration between the early 1980s and late 1990s,
using various measures).
129. The idea here is not merely that the social norms that influence management
behavior will be less geographically diverse, but that the influence of positive norms will
be more attenuated because of management's increased distance from the communities
where the firm operates and the social pressures that may be brought to bear. See
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY 39 (2001) (observing that
detachment of corporate executives from people who are affected by their decisions
undercuts the executives' "caring impulse"); Elhauge, supra note 14, at 838 ("The
manager who has operated in a local community and seen first hand the sundry ways in
which the corporation has impacted or benefited from that community will be more likely
to want to make donations to benefit that local community.").
130. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 203 (1978) (describing the goal of retaining local control over industry as part of an

"ancient and disreputable 'social purpose' theory of antitrust"); see also Thomas B. Leary,
The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 112
(2002) (claiming that the objection to an exclusive focus on economics "has simply
vanished from the mainstream debate over antitrust policy").
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business was an important concern of Congress when it passed the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950,31 strengthening section 7 of the Clayton
Act.
A.

Legislative History

The Supreme Court exhaustively reviewed the legislative history
of the Celler-Kefauver Act in the landmark Brown Shoe case.' The
Court explained that "[t]he dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy." ' 33
Congress sought to avoid lessened
competition and further increases in economic concentration134 not
131. Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). The Celler-Kefauver Act enacted the
current language of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which bars any acquisition whose effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (2005). The original section 7, enacted in 1914, was "directed primarily at the
development of holding companies and at the secret acquisition of competitors through
the purchase of all or parts of such competitors' stock." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 314 (1962). Because the original act did not apply to asset acquisitions,
mergers, or consolidations, it "became largely a dead letter." United States v. Phil. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 339-40 (1963). The Celler-Kefauver Act "was intended not only to
enlarge the number of transactions covered by § 7 but also to change the test of illegality."
Id. at 340 n.18; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, DistributiveJustice and the Antitrust Laws,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1982) ("The Congress that amended section 7 of the
Clayton Act in 1950 believed that it was virtually rewriting the anti-merger statute to make
it effective where it had formerly been impotent.").
132. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). The conventional
approaches to statutory interpretation continue to give significant weight to legislative
history to shed light on the purposes of a statute. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY:

INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 85-101 (2005) (arguing

that a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, based on legislative history, is more
consistent with democratic values and sound policy than a textualist approach); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2054 n.43 (2006) (reviewing
ADRIAN VERMULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF

LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006)) ("Since the New Deal, legislative history has been an
essential source of statutory meaning."). Legislative history has also been a traditional
normative anchor in antitrust scholarship, even among conservative scholars. See, e.g.,
BORK, supra note 130, at 61-63 (contending that the legislative history of the Sherman
Act "displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare");
Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 381, 396 (1980) (contending that a "close reading of the legislative history"
of the Celler-Kefauver Act "supports the conclusion that the new law was not meant to
preclude efficiency as a justification for merger"). Its importance has waned in recent
years, however. See generally David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent,
66 MO. L. REV. 725 (2001) (discussing judicial and academic stances toward legislative
history).
133. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 315.
134. See S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 3 (1950) ("The purpose of the proposed bill ... is to
limit future increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from corporate
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merely-or even predominantly-because of the adverse "economic"
effects of concentration, but also because of its "social" or "political"
consequences.'35 As the Court observed, "Throughout the recorded
discussion may be found examples of Congress' fear not only of
accelerated concentration of economic power on economic grounds,
but also of the threat to other values a trend toward concentration
was thought to pose."' 36 According to the Court, such values
included, in particular, "the desirability of retaining 'local control'
'
over industry and the protection of small businesses." 137
Congress's concern over the loss of local control of business is
reflected in part in the comments of the sponsors of the bill, Senator
Estes Kefauver and Representative Emmanuel Celler, among
others. 3 8 During the Senate debate on the bill, Kefauver stated:
mergers and acquisitions. The bill would accomplish this purpose by enabling the Federal
Trade Commission to prevent those acquisitions which substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly."); H. REP. No. 81-1191, at 3 (1949) (stating that the legislation
is concerned with "the broad economic problem of high and increasing [economic]
concentration"); see also Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Amending the
Clayton Act, PUB. PAPERS 763 (Dec. 29, 1950) ("I have repeatedly recommended the
enactment of this legislation to the Congress, as a major element in the program of this
administration to prevent the growth of monopoly and greater concentration of economic
power and to create conditions favorable to small and independent business.").
135. In his seminal article on section 7 of the Clayton Act, Derek.Bok observed:
To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors and administrators with the
economic consequences of monopoly power, the curious aspect of the debates is
the paucity of remarks having to do with the effects of concentration on prices,
innovation, distribution, and efficiency. To be sure, there were allusions to the
need for preserving competition. But competition appeared to possess a strong
socio-political connotation which centered on the virtues of the small entrepreneur
to an extent seldom duplicated in economic literature.
Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REV. 226, 236 (1960); see id. at 248 ("[I]t seems abundantly clear that
'competition' meant far more to Congress than prices, costs, and product innovations.").
136. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316.
137. Id. at 315-16; see also id. at 333 ("Congress was desirous of preventing the
formation of further oligopolies with their attendant adverse effects upon local control of
industry and upon small business."); id. at 344 ("[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses."); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 283 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("A major aspect of [Congress's fear of large corporations buying out small
corporations] was the perceived trend toward absentee ownership of local business.").
138. The statements of a bill's sponsors are traditionally afforded great weight in
determining legislative intent. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728 (1983) (noting
that the statement of a bill sponsor is an "authoritative guide to the statute's construction"
(internal quotations omitted)). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL.,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 302-04 (2000) (maintaining that
sponsor statements rank just below committee reports in hierarchy of legislative history
sources).
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I think that we are approaching a point where a fundamental
decision must be made in regard to this problem of economic
concentration. Shall we permit the economy of the country to
gravitate into the hands of a few corporations ... with centraloffice managers remote from the places where their products
are made, and the destiny of the people determined by the
decisions of persons whom they never see, or even know of?
Or on the other hand are we going to preserve small business,
local operations, and free enterprise?139
Kefauver argued, "Local economic independence cannot be
preserved in the face of consolidations such as we have had during the
past few years," adding:
The control of American business is steadily being transferred
...from local communities to a few large cities in which central
managers decide the policies and the fate of the far-flung
enterprises they control. Millions of people depend helplessly
on their judgment. Through monopolistic mergers the people
are losing power to direct their own economic welfare.1 4 °
Representative Celler expressed similar sentiments.
At a
hearing on the bill, he told a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee, "The bills offered you are not a complete remedy, but
they will help to the extent that they will put the brakes upon ... the
'
evil tendency of the big fellows to swallow up the little fellows."141
He
added:
As the Senator [Kefauver] pointed out, and as I wish to
emphasize same, the swallowing up of these small-business
entities transfers control from small communities to a few cities
where large companies control local destinies. Local people
lose their power to control their own local economic affairs.
14 2
Local matters are within remote control.

139. 96 CONG. REC. 16,450 (1950).
140. Id. at 16,452. During the House Judiciary Committee hearing on the bill,
Kefauver explained that he "became interested in this matter" when shown "statistics
indicating how locally owned corporations in the State of Tennessee, year by year, had
been acquired by the large national companies and placed under national management,
with the directors being in distant cities." Amending Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act:
Hearing on H.R. 988, et al. Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,81st
Cong. 12 (1949) [hereinafter Hearing]. Kefauver added, "When the destiny of people over
the land is dependent upon the decision of two or three people in a central office
somewhere, then the people are going to demand that the Government do something
about it." Id.
141. Hearing,supra note 140 at 15.
142. Id. at 16.
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During the debate on the House floor, Representative Joseph
Bryson of South Carolina spoke extensively about the "problem of
'
outside control of local enterprises, 143
with particular reference to
the textile industry in the South. Bryson, a member of the House
Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported the bill, identified
"three important advantages of local ownership, both to the
communities involved and the Nation as a whole."'" First, he cited
better labor management relations, because "[u]nder local ownership,
there is common knowledge and acquaintanceship between workers
on the one hand and the mill owners on the other." '45 By contrast,
the outside owner of the mill "does not know the workers and they do
not know him; he may never even visit the properties to which he
holds title; to the workers, ownership is impersonalized, distant, and
unapproachable."' 4 6 Second, he noted that "under local management
the legitimate profits of industry tend to remain at home and promote
the well-being of the home town. In contrast, under the new outside
ownership, the profits are siphoned off to distant areas" and may be
used for nonproductive purposes.'4 7
Third, Bryson observed that local ownership promoted civic
welfare, referring to the findings of the Mills and Ulmer report to the
Senate Small Business Committee. Bryson stated:
Under local ownership, there are strong social and civic ties
that bind the community together. Under outside ownership,
these ties are weakened and broken.
Merchants and
manufacturers do not get together in local organizations for the
obvious reason that the owners of the manufacturing firms live
elsewhere. Hence the drive for civic improvements of one kind
or another generally tends to disappear 48in towns which have
become the victims of outside ownership.1

143. 95 CONG. REC. 11,494 (1949).

144. Id. at 11,495.
145. Id.
146. Id.

147. Id.
148. Id. Bryson said, "If anyone has any doubts on this point, I would like to refer him
to a report of the Senate Small Business Committee of the Seventy-ninth Congress
entitled 'Small Business and Civic Welfare,' " and then highlighted the findings of the
report. ld; see also 96 CONG. REC. 16,444 (1950) (Senator Murray, in Senate floor debate,
noted that Butte, Montana, which had once been prosperous, "has come to the point
where today there is only one single corporation operating there, and that through
absentee management," and that its experience demonstrates "what happens to a
community when consolidations are permitted to wipe out independent concerns").
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Local Control and "Competition"

As the legislative history demonstrates, there is little doubt that
in enacting the Celler-Kefauver amendments Congress was
concerned with the loss of local control of industry.'4 9 However,
Congress did not bar mergers that result in the loss of local control;
rather, it barred mergers that may substantially lessen competition.
While the meaning of "competition" in section 7 is vague and
contested, 5 ' it would be a stretch to equate the loss of local control
with a lessening of competition without reference to a merger's effect
on product markets. 1 ' Insofar as "competition" involves some notion
of business rivalry,'52 promoting local control may be viewed as a
149. Leading antitrust scholars concur. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST
LAW
904, at 27 (2d ed. 2006) ("Congress was concerned not merely with the fate of
small business, but also with the separation of ownership and control that was seen as
attending the large corporation and making its actions socially irresponsible."); Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1064 (1979)
("Virtually all proponents of the bill who spoke asserted that the merger trend must be
blocked because ... absentee ownership by large corporations would diminish local
initiative and civic responsibility.").
150. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849,
910 (2000) (maintaining that "there is no rigid or even clear vision of 'competition'
embedded in the text of the antitrust laws"). Compare 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 149,
903, at 25 (" '[C]ompetition' has a clearly defined meaning. It refers to a situation in
which prices are driven to cost and firms are forced to match wits with each other to create
and distribute products and services that are most pleasing to consumers."), with Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 254 (1985)
(" 'Competition' within the meaning of the statute does not refer to a state of affairs in
which prices are driven to marginal cost and firms are encouraged to pursue all economies
in production and distribution. Rather it refers to a regime in which small businesses have
a chance to compete against larger, more efficient rivals.").
151. It is possible to argue that the elimination of a significant locally controlled firm
constitutes an injury to "competition" apart from a merger's effect on product markets, to
the extent that "competition" refers to a particular vision of the competitive system. See
Harlan M. Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555,
585 (1973) (arguing that Congress was concerned with injury to the "competitive system,"
not just concentration in particular markets, and thus pure conglomerate mergers
involving large firms could be reached under section 7); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ,
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992, at 214 (1996) (maintaining that Congress's
"concerns about 'economic concentration' bore on the larger sphere of a competitive
economy rather than the microeconomic model of a competitive market"). But even the
Court in Brown Shoe suggested that the starting point in the analysis of competitive effects
was on product markets, although the ultimate concerns may have been "noneconomic."
See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333 (1962) ("[N]ot only must we
consider the probable effects of the merger upon the economics of the particular markets
affected but also we must consider its probable effects upon the economic way of life
sought to be preserved by Congress.").
152. See Harry S. Gerla, Restoring Rivalry as a Central Concept in Antitrust Law, 75
NEB. L. REV. 209 passim (1996) (arguing that "competition" under antitrust laws means
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secondary goal or byproduct of preventing mergers that lessen
competition.'5 3 Not all mergers involving a loss of local control lessen
competition (e.g., a pure conglomerate merger between companies
headquartered in different regions). And not all mergers that lessen
competition involve a loss of local control; indeed an anticompetitive
merger arguably might enhance local control (e.g., two competing
local firms may merge to form a monopoly to prevent acquisition by
an outsider).
But the fact that local control is largely independent of the
degree to which a merger lessens competition does not preclude it
from playing a role in evaluating the lawfulness of a merger.154
Because of the very ambiguity of the term "competition," it is
necessary to consider the objectives of Congress in interpreting and
applying the term in practice. Moreover, even if one accepts the
rivalry); accord Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 209-10 (1987). Blake argued that "competition" in the CellerKefauver Act must mean something broader than "rivalry" because the Act was clearly
intended to cover conglomerate and vertical mergers. See Blake, supra note 151, at 58283. Indeed, whereas the original section 7 barred stock acquisitions where the effect may
be to "substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition," the Celler-Kefauver Act barred acquisitions
where the effect may be "substantially to lessen competition," without qualification. See
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311 n.18 (identifying changes in language).
153. Cf BORK, supra note 130, at 202 ("A policy of preserving competition in
particular markets would have as side effects the tendencies to lessen the supposed pace of
overall concentration in the economy, maintain local control over some firms that would
otherwise be acquired, and preserve some small business.").
154. 1 say "largely" independent to emphasize the qualification noted above that
insofar as competition refers to the nature of the competitive system sought to be
promoted by Congress, local control may be viewed as a "meta-competitive" value. Cf
Bok, supra note 135, at 305 ("In amending section 7 ... Congress sketched a rather clear
image of the 'kind of an economy' it desired to encourage."). Moreover, local control
could be viewed in conventional competitive terms as a quality of the goods or services
provided by firms as to which firms compete. See, e.g., Janet H. Cho, Buying Local:
Merchants Boast of Better Service than Their Big Box Competitors; Loyal Shoppers
Celebrate Independents, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 5, 2005, at El (discussing
"buy local" campaigns in various cities); see also Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for
Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118
HARV. L. REV. 526 (2004) (reviewing evidence that consumers have preferences for the
way in which goods and services are produced and arguing that such "process" preferences
should be given more weight in legal and regulatory analysis); Neil W. Averitt & Robert
H. Lande, Implementing the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (maintaining that nonprice competition should have a
greater role in antitrust analysis). Indeed, in certain industries such as banking, local
control appears to have some direct effects on the nature of the services provided. See
infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, for purposes of argument, I am
willing to concede that local control is a noncompetitive factor in the sense that the
primary effect at issue is not on the rivalry of firms nor on consumers as purchasers of
goods and services.
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modern construction that lessening of competition means the creation
of market power or, perhaps, the elevation of prices, 155 it is often
highly uncertain whether a merger will be anticompetitive.156 Thus,
accepting the primacy of modern competitive concerns should not
rule out consideration of other values implicit in the statute, at least
where the competitive effects of a merger are ambiguous. 5 7

Moreover, merger doctrine sometimes takes "noncompetitive"
concerns into account. 158

The clearest example is the failing-firm

155. This is essentially the perspective of the federal agencies' Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 0.1 (1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz book/hmgl.html ("The unifying theme of
the guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power
or to facilitate its exercise.").
156. See 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 149, T 905c, at 32 (noting that "economic
theory, except in the more obvious cases, does not permit confident judgments [as to a
merger's competitive effects] even when all the economically relevant facts can be
assembled").
157. Other scholars have pointed to the indeterminacy of conventional competitive
analysis as grounds for taking into account "noneconomic" values in merger and
nonmerger cases. See Pitofsky, supra note 149, at 1060 (arguing that an "exclusively
economic approach [to mergers] reflects an unrealistically optimistic view of the certainty
introduced by that kind of analysis"); Joseph Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A
StructuralSynthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 40 (1977) (arguing that nonefficiency goals may be a
factor in potential competition doctrine as "an additional effect to be considered in a
merger suspect on other grounds, [but] not an independent justification for policy");
Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonald, Why (and How) Fairness Matters at the
IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1818-19 (2003) (proposing a rule for
analyzing intellectual property/antitrust issues that would give consumers a fair share of
the surplus when direct evidence of efficiency is inconclusive); Stephen F. Ross, Network
Effects and the Limits of GTE Sylvania's Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 945, 947
(2001) (arguing that when courts cannot practically determine net welfare effects of the
conduct at issue, they should employ "Jacksonian value of equal economic opportunity" in
specified circumstances); see also Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How
Much is Enough?, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 39-40 (2001) (arguing that the indeterminacy of
dynamic efficiency arguments in antitrust should open the door to consideration of socalled "noneconomic" values).
158. Indeed, the Antitrust Division has taken "local control" into account to a limited
extent in connection with merger remedies. For example, in the Fleet/BankBoston
merger, which involved the largest bank divestiture in history, the Justice Department
required the bulk of the divestures to go to a primary out-of-state buyer, but a portion of
the divested deposits and branches under the settlement were to be sold to Massachusetts
community banks. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires
Fleet Financial and BankBoston to Divest 306 Branches in Four New England States
(Sept. 2, 1999) (reporting that $810 million, or about six percent of the divested deposits,
would be sold to community banks). The Department's usual bank-merger divestiture
policy is to insist that the parties divest assets within a geographic market to a single buyer
on the theory that such a buyer will compete more effectively against the merged firm
than multiple smaller competitors. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BANK
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS HANDBOOK 80 (2006). Its limited exception in the
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defense, which recognizes Congress's concern with the welfare of
local communities. Under the failing-firm defense, the acquisition by
a competitor of a firm "with resources so depleted and the prospect of
rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a
business failure" is exempt from section 7, regardless of its
anticompetitive effect.159 Originally articulated by the Supreme Court
in International Shoe Co. v. FTC,16 the failing-firm defense was
endorsed by Congress in adopting the Celler-Kefauver amendments,
notwithstanding that the language of section 7 (both before and after
the amendments) expressly barred anticompetitive mergers without
exception. Congress was concerned, as the committee reports make
clear, that a business failure would result in "loss to its stockholders
and injury to the communities where its plants were operated."'' Even
today, leading commentators acknowledge that the failing-firm

Fleet/BankBoston case appears to reflect the value that local congressional leaders placed
on community banking. See Joan Vennochi, Unknowns in the Fleet-BankBoston Merger
Formula, BOSTON GLOBE, June 22, 1999, at A15 (reporting that the Antitrust Division
changed its position on the divestiture package after meeting with Massachusetts
congressional delegation); Letter from Mass. Cong. Delegation to Robert Brady, Vice
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston (July 7, 1999) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (stressing the position that regulators should create a divestiture package
suitable for bidding for community banks because of the important role that such
institutions play in communities). More generally, Pitofsky has suggested that courts
sometimes take "noncompetitive" concerns into account as a factor in the remedy phase
of a merger proceeding or in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction under
a "public interest" standard. See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Modified: Education, Defense,
and Other Worthy Enterprises, ANTITRUST, Spring 1995, at 23, 24 (citing defense and steel
mergers). But see Pennsylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., No. CIV. A. 93-1972, 1993
WL 145264, at *12 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 1993) (in evaluating irreparable harm, court refused
to consider harm from plant closing unrelated to anticompetitive effect of merger).
159. Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930); see Citizen's Publ'g Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 137-38 (1969) (stating requirements of defense).
160. Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-03 (holding that the acquisition of stock of a failing firm
"does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within the intent of the
Clayton Act").
161. S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 7 (1950) (emphasis added) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at
302); H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 6 (1949) (same); see also Bok, supra note 135, at 340
(stating that the strongest reasons for the failing-firm defense "stemmed from a legislative
concern over the various interests involved in the life of a failing enterprise"). The
Supreme Court has explained the rationale for the failing-firm defense in terms of
noncompetitive concerns, at least in part. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486, 507 (1974) ("The failing-firm defense presupposes that the effect on competition
and the 'loss to [the company's] stockholders and injury to the communities where its
plants were operated' ... will be less if a company continues to exist even as a party to a
merger than if it disappears entirely from the market. It is, in a sense, a 'lesser of two
evils' approach, in which the possible threat to competition resulting from an acquisition is
deemed preferable to the adverse impact on competition and other losses if the company
goes out of business." (quoting Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302)).
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defense reflects a concern for noncompetitive "social" costs. 162 In any
event, Congress's intent, not expressed in the language of the Act, to
protect communities from plant closings and other injury that may
result from the failure of a firm-at the possible expense of
"competition"-provides some support for recognizing Congress's
intent to protect communities from the loss of local control in
mergers that arguably lessen competition.
The efficiencies defense also arguably involves noncompetitive
concerns. 163 Under the "total welfare" version of the efficiencies
defense, a merger that is prima facie anticompetitive (say, because it
significantly increases market concentration) should be permitted if
the efficiencies (i.e., cost savings) from the merger are greater than
the increase in market power (deadweight loss);" 6 under the
"consumer welfare" version favored by the federal agencies,165 such a

162. See 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 149, T 952c2, at 251 ("[C]ongressional adoption
of International Shoe and the 'failing company' defense seem clearly to require that
private interests be given some recognition, and it would not be responsive to that
legislative history to confine the defense solely to cases where the tribunal can additionally
conclude that, as a result of failure, the merger is not likely to have the requisite
anticompetitive effects."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 27 (2d ed. 2001) ("If
the sole concern of the Clayton Act were with competition and efficiency, there would be
no need for a failing-company defense."). But see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 155, § 5 (treating the failing-firm "defense" not as a defense at all, but simply as
an instance when "a merger is not likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its
exercise"). The failing-firm defense may conflict with a purely competitive analysis when,
for example, the acquisition by a dominant firm of assets that would otherwise exit the
market would entrench the dominant firm's position, see 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note
149, J 952b, at 247, or when the prospect of the failure of the acquired firm is less than
certain, see Edward 0. Correia, Re-Examining the Failing Company Defense, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 683, 690 (1996).

163. It is also worth noting that courts sometimes take into account "noncompetitive"
factors under section 1 of the Sherman Act, even though the Supreme Court's section 1
jurisprudence is less hospitable to such concerns than its section 7 precedent. See Pitofsky,
supra note 158, at 25 (noting that "[1]ower courts, despite the apparently absolute rule of
Professional Engineers, often do take noncompetitive considerations into account"); see,
e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the lower
court should have considered "noneconomic" or "social welfare" justifications for
restraint under the rule of reason).
164. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (offering a seminal analysis of the
welfare tradeoff model).
165. A "total welfare" standard assesses welfare in terms of maximizing producer and
consumer surplus without regard to distribution. It is largely synonymous with "wealth
maximization" and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency, although it focuses on a
narrow range of effects (i.e., a "partial equilibrium" analysis). See infra note 197 and
accompanying text. By contrast, "consumer welfare" ordinarily refers to the welfare of
consumers as purchasers of goods and services, and it assesses welfare in terms of
maximizing consumer surplus. For a concise description of the welfare standard debate in
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merger is permitted if the efficiencies are sufficient to ensure that
prices will not rise. 166 While efficiencies are often characterized as
"procompetitive," this modern convention is surely not what
Congress had in mind. As Professor Hammer concludes, "The fiction
that ... increases in efficiency and total welfare are 'pro-competitive,'
while alluring, is difficult to reconcile with either economic or
legislative understandings of 'competition.' ",167 Indeed, Supreme
Court precedent quite clearly suggests that whether a merger is
anticompetitive and whether it promotes efficiency are separate
matters and that gains in efficiency cannot justify a significant

antitrust, see Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a PoliticalBargain, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 483, 515-18 (2006).
166. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 155, § 4 ("IT]he Agency
considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's
potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in
that market.").
167. Hammer, supra note 150, at 913; see also Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell,
Is There a Text in This Class?: The Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 645-47 (2005) (maintaining that the efficiency defense is
not consistent with a textualist reading of the word "competition" insofar as the defense
would permit firms in oligopolistic industry to merge). To be sure, the consumer welfare
version of the efficiencies defense adopted by the federal agencies (which deems
efficiencies pro-competitive when they lead to lower prices) is more defensible from a
textualist point of view, but it stretches the term "competition" to the breaking point when
concentration is significantly increased. See id. Either version of the efficiencies defense
seems inconsistent with congressional understanding of "competition." See Bok, supra
note 135, at 318 ("The possibility of lower costs was brushed aside in the legislative
deliberations and there is every reason to believe that Congress preferred the
noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to limited reductions in the cost of
operations."). But see 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW I 970d, at 32 (2d
ed. 2006) (maintaining that the efficiencies defense "is not seriously inconsistent with
either the language of § 7 or its legislative history"); Muris, supra note 132, at 393-402.
Advocates of an efficiencies defense point to portions of the legislative history of the
Celler-Kefauver Act that indicate Congress did not intend to prevent small firms from
merging to compete more effectively against large companies, which supposedly assumes a
recognition of efficiencies. See, e.g., 4A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 167, 970c2, at 29-30
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 8 (1949)). However, the principal explanation offered
for why the merger of small competitors did not violate the Act was that such a merger
would not substantially lessen competition. See H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 7 (1949)
(quoting Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 298, which distinguished between an acquisition that
results in "some" lessening of competition and one that results in lessening competition
"to a substantial degree"). In any event, the fact that Congress contemplated that the
merger of small companies might stimulate competition against larger firms dominating
the market is entirely consistent with a structural view of competition that focuses on
economic concentration, not efficiency. Cf Bok, supra note 135, at 320 (noting that
Congress "was concerned not merely with the enhancement of commercial rivalry, but
with many other interests which it was thought would be protected by the prevention of
further concentration").
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impairment of competition.'6 8 To be sure, as Professor Fox states,

although "[t]he

U.S.

antitrust

laws protect competition, not

efficiencies, ... efficient markets and efficient competitors are
expected products of the system." 16 9 In other words, promoting
efficiency might be seen as one of the secondary goals or byproducts
of restricting anticompetitive mergers. 7 ° Yet insofar as Congress was

interested in promoting efficiency, both the legislative history of the
Celler-Kefauver Act and the Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the act suggest that such a goal was less important than promoting
decentralized, local control of business. Thus, in terms of the

statutory language, legislative intent, and Supreme Court precedent,
the case for giving consideration to local control as a noncompetitive

factor in merger analysis is at least as strong as the case for an
efficiencies defense.
C.

Local Control and Modern Antitrust

A critic might accept that when Congress amended the Clayton
Act in 1950 it was concerned about the effect of mergers on local
control and other so-called "noneconomic" values and that the

Supreme Court in the 1960s validated these concerns. But the critic
might argue that antitrust has changed profoundly since then to the
point where such concerns are merely historical relics in the evolution
of a more advanced antitrust policy that focuses exclusively on
"economic" concerns, expressed in terms of consumer welfare or total
welfare. 7 ' The critic might justify a revisionist approach to section 7
168. See FTFC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) ("Congress was aware
that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the
balance in favor of protecting competition."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962) ("Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing
considerations in favor of decentralization."). But cf FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708,
720 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that whether there is an efficiencies defense is "not a
closed book," and quoting Areeda and Turner's attempt to distinguish Procter& Gamble
by the fact that the Supreme Court "referred only to 'possible' economies and to
economies that 'may' result from mergers that lessen competition. To reject an economies
defense based on mere possibilities does not mean that one should reject such a defense
based on more convincing proof." (citations omitted)).
169. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 728 (1996).
170. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert ,H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1580, 1589-90 (1983) (maintaining that Congress believed
that restricting large mergers would promote productive efficiency).
171. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 208 (2005) (stating that "the fundamental ideology of mergers has shifted
dramatically over the last three decades and now embodies values that are inconsistent at
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not by reference to the intent of the 1950 Congress nor new Supreme
Court interpretations of the statute, but rather by appealing to an

"organic" or dynamic methodology of statutory interpretation based
on professional consensus,'17 2 lower-court decisions, and the
acquiescence of Congress to the change in approach.17 3 The critic
would be mistaken, however.174
As an initial matter, modern merger law takes into account
concerns that are said to be "noneconomic."
For example,
distributional fairness remains an important goal of modern merger
law (and the Sherman Act as well).'7 5 Indeed, distributional fairness
the most fundamental level with those that the Supreme Court last articulated"); ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE STATE OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT-

2004, at 7 (2005) (arguing that "during the last third of the 20th century, the U.S. witnessed
profound changes to the nature of antitrust enforcement," away from the 1960s' emphasis
on "populist values," and that there is now a bipartisan consensus that the primary
concern of antitrust enforcement is "the welfare of consumers"). For a discussion of
consumer welfare and total welfare standards, see supra note 165.
172. See POSNER, supra note 162, at ix ("Almost everyone professionally involved in
antitrust today ...not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to
promote economic welfare, but also agrees ... that economic welfare should be
understood in terms of the economist's concept of efficiency ....
").
173. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 917 (arguing that changes in modern merger
policy "obtain their legitimacy through the persuasiveness of their underlying
justifications, the length of time they endure, and the acquiescence of the legislative
branch").
174. In his new book, Professor Hovenkamp acknowledges that Brown Shoe "more or
less accurately" reported the legislative history of the Cellar-Kefauver Act, HOVENKAMP,
supra note 171, at 210, but argues that the intent of Congress should be ignored
notwithstanding the ambiguity of the statutory language, see id. at 43. Characterizing the
intent of Congress as "protectionist" of small business, see id. at 42 ("[T]he protected class
in Congress's collective minds in 1950 when the merger statute was amended were small
businesses injured by mergers that streamlined production and distribution, creating large
vertically integrated firms that undersold their rivals."), Professor Hovenkamp suggests
that taking that intent seriously leads to indefensible conclusions, namely that a larger,
more efficient firm is an affirmative evil, and that mergers should be condemned at very
low concentration levels, see id. at 208--10. However, it is not clear why Congress's
preference for less concentrated market structures amounts to "special interest"
legislation or why that preference leads to deconcentration at all costs. Certainly, the
Court in Brown Shoe did not see it that way. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (acknowledging that the Clayton Act protects competition, not
competitors, but stating that Congress was willing to accept occasional higher costs and
prices that resulted from fragmented industries and markets); cf Hovenkamp, supra note
131, at 23, 30 (contending that Congress's intent to protect small business may have been
wealth-maximizing; "[a]ntitrust policy must come to grips with the fact that people may
sometimes be willing to pay higher consumer prices to realize certain values, and that
these values cannot always be determined in the voluntary market").
175. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 155, § 0.1 (explaining that
the exercise of market power, which is a main concern of the guidelines, results in "a
transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a misallocation of resources" (emphasis
added)). The seminal article making the case that the antitrust laws were designed
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is a hallmark of the dominant "consumer welfare" approach insofar
as that approach condemns mergers that transfer wealth from
consumers to producers even when the mergers would increase
efficiency and total welfare.'76 But distributional considerations may
sometimes run in favor of producers, as in the case of mergers that
create monopsony (i.e., buyer) power, which may be condemned
regardless of their effect on consumers. 177 Moreover, modern merger
law continues to resonate with entrepreneurial-freedom objectives,
particularly in the case of vertical mergers. Thus, courts still cite
Brown Shoe's formulation that the "primary vice" of vertical mergers
is that of "foreclosing the competitors of either [merging] party from
a segment of the market otherwise open to them" because such
foreclosure may act as a "clog on competition" and "deprive rivals of
a fair opportunity to compete. ' 178 Also, the continued reliance by
principally to prevent unfair wealth transfers is Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982). See also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and TechnologicalProgress,62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 103239 (1987) (articulating antitrust's concern with the welfare of consumers).
176. See Baker, supra note 165, at 516-18.
177. For example, in a recent case, the Justice Department challenged the merger of
the second and third largest grain traders in North America, alleging that in certain
geographic markets the merged firm would depress the prices paid to farmers. See
Complaint at 34, United States v. Cargill, Inc., No. 99:CV01875 (D.D.C. July 8, 1999).
There was no claim that the firm's exercise of monopsony power would result in increased
prices to consumers, nor did the government's competitive analysis suggest any such harm.
See United States v. Cargill, Inc., Public Comment and Plaintiff's Response, 65 Fed. Reg.
15,982, 15,986-87 (Mar. 24, 2000). Indeed, it is sometimes thought that monopsony power,
by lowering a firm's costs, leads to lower consumer prices. See, e.g., Kartell v. Blue Shield,
749 F.2d 922, 930-31 (1st Cir. 1984). To be sure, to the extent that a monopsonist reduces
its input purchases, then preventing monopsony power may increase total welfare, or even
consumer welfare if the monopsonist reduces output in the downstream market as a result
of purchasing fewer inputs. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust
Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 315-20 (1991). However, monopsony
mergers may be suspect when they merely transfer wealth from atomistic sellers. See
Warren S. Grimes, Buyer Power and Retail Gatekeeper Power: Protecting Competition
and the Atomistic Seller, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 573-75 (2005) (arguing that atomistic
sellers deserve protection from monopsonistic wealth transfers); see also Todd v. Exxon
Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 214 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing the dismissal of a complaint by workers
alleging that an information exchange among employers violated the rule of reason,
without harm to consumers; "[i]n an oligopsony, the risk is that buyers will collude to
depress prices, causing harm to sellers"); United States v. Pook, Crim. No. 87-274, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3398, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1988) (upholding a conviction for bid
rigging by antiques buyers that lowered prices at public auctions for consigned antiques
and deprived sellers of "the proper share of ultimate sales prices").
178. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 511 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 324); see also Yankees Entm't & Sports Network, LLC
v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 657, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Brown Shoe
formulation and concluding that the plaintiff had "standing to assert that the acquisition
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courts on the structural presumption of anticompetitive effects based
on market concentration17 9 may be interpreted as reflecting
''noneconomic" concerns in light of what many economists view as a
relatively modest relationship between market concentration and
prices. is So, too, the Second Circuit case law holding that targets
have standing to challenge unwanted takeovers recognizes the
''noneconomic" value of preserving the independent existence of a
competitor."18
Second, the legitimacy of completely ignoring Congress's
"social" or "political" objectives is open to question.182 To be sure,
has deprived it of a fair opportunity to compete"). The FTC's treatment of the AOL/Time
Warner merger evoked similar concerns. Chairman Pitofsky stated,
In the broad sense, our concern was that the merger of these two powerful
companies would deny to competitors access to this amazing new broadband
This order is intended to ensure that this new medium,
technology....
characterized by openness, diversity and freedom, will not be closed down as a
result of this merger.
Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions (Dec. 14,
2000), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.htm.
179. See United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (adopting
structural presumption based on the congressional concern with concentration); FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying a strong version of presumption in
a proposed merger between the second and third largest firms in a three-firm market).
180. See Jonathan B. Baker, Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated
Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 135, 152-55 (2002)
(noting the limitations of empirical evidence on relationship between market
concentration and prices and seeking to put structural presumption on firmer economic
footing); Pitofsky, supra note 149, at 1069-71 (arguing that "political" rather than
"economic" factors justify a presumption at relatively low levels of market concentration);
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 15-16 (2000) (contending that the incipiency standard of
section 7 partly reflects a "Jeffersonian ideal of dispersed economic power").
181. See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252,258-59 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a target has standing to challenge a hostile takeover on the theory that the
elimination of the independent existence of a major competitor is the "type of injury the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent"). But see Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc.,
976 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1992) (disagreeing with Gold Fields and holding that targets lack
Professor Brodley maintains recognition of loss of
standing to challenge merger).
independence as a measure of antitrust injury validates a key congressional goal in
enacting the Celler-Kefauver Act, namely preserving the independence of business firms
threatened by a perceived "rising tide" of concentration. Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust
Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public Enforcement
Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 94 (1995). Brodley also points out that a merger-induced
output reduction injures the target firm "in fact" because the welfare of the firm under
corporate law includes the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, such as workers and
the communities in which the firm operates, who may be harmed by a reduction in output,
even if shareholders benefit from higher prices. Id. at 84-85.
182. See, e.g., Shores, supra note 132, at 725 (questioning the legitimacy of antitrust
jurisprudence that ignores intent of Congress); Thomas Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of
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the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act dynamically,
adapting it to meet "changed circumstances and the lessons of
accumulated experience."18' 3 But the Court has done so on the
premise that section 1 of the Sherman Act "invokes the common law
itself."'' " The Court has never abandoned legislative intent as a
touchstone of interpreting section 7 of the Clayton Act, nor has it
repudiated Brown Shoe.'85 In any event, even interpreting section 7
dynamically would not ignore legislative intent but rather would
apply the statute to new circumstances in conformance with the
general principles and purposes declared by the legislature.'86 As for
congressional acquiescence to a purely "economic" approach to
Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1986) (same,
addressing the Sherman Act); see also Farber & McDonnell, supra note 167, at 657-68
(arguing that the reigning approach to interpreting antitrust laws as focused on economic
efficiency is illegitimate from a textualist perspective); Hovenkamp, supra note 131, at 31
("[W]hen congressional intent in enacting a particular statute, such as the ... CellerKefauver Act, is to recognize values other than low consumer prices, courts must
effectuate that intent."); Kaplow, supra note 152, at 212 ("For the courts to proclaim
efficiency as the sole objective of antitrust ... would constitute a substantial political act
indeed, and precisely the sort that would be condemned by those who generally counsel
judicial restraint and defend the judicial role as being distinct from that of the
legislature.").
183. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); see also William N. Eskridge & John
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1234 (2001) (describing the Sherman Act as
an example of a "super-statute" that has been applied in a dynamic rather than a textbounded or originalist way).
184. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 21 (internal quotations omitted).
185. Indeed, when the Court liberalized somewhat the standard for liability in General
Dynamics-its most recent (albeit three decades old) substantive merger case of
significance-it indicated that its decision was consistent with Brown Shoe and
congressional concern over economic concentration. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-98 (1974); see also Kaplow, supra note 152, at 186 ("General
Dynamics ... involved no revolution in the use of economics in antitrust
decisionmaking."). Moreover, the Celler-Kefauver Act, like the Clayton Act it amended,
was enacted largely because of congressional dissatisfaction with the Court's "common
law" interpretation of the Sherman Act. See POSNER, supra note 162, at 122 ("Congress
wanted to stiffen the vague and loose legal standard of Columbia Steel, in much the same
way that the original Clayton Act had been intended to harden the vague 'Rule of Reason'
laid down in the Standard Oil decision."); Farber & McDonnell, supra note 167, at 642-43.
But cf Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 860, 872-73
(2006) (construing Robinson Patman Act "consistently with broader policies of the
antitrust laws," whose primary concern is "[i]nterbrand competition" (internal quotes
omitted)).
186. See Shores, supra note 132, at 740 (quoting Senator Sherman to this effect). One
can agree that the vague language of the antitrust statutes, including section 7, gives courts
wide discretion to apply them in practice, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 171, at 44 (stating
that "the very spareness of the statutes has invited the courts to create a kind of 'common
law' of antitrust"), without relegating congressional intent to an irrelevance, see Shores,
supra note 132, at 792 (maintaining that "generality of the statutory text ought to elevate
the role of legislative history and congressional intent in proper judicial interpretation").
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mergers, this argument

is problematic

not only

because the

jurisprudential basis for relying on post-enactment legislative inaction
is highly controversial'87 but also because the evidence of such
acquiescence is mixed at best. For example, Congress did not pass
the Reagan administration's proposed Merger Modernization Act of
1986, which would have codified the merger guidelines' focus on
market power.188
Certainly, Congress has not signaled that
''noneconomic" values should be ruled out when the competitive
effects of mergers are ambiguous. 18 9
Finally, there is no reason to consider the preservation of local
control of business to be a value outside the realm of economics or
efficiency analysis. On a theoretical level, a preference for local
control expressed by Congress, rather than the marketplace, deserves
weight in an efficiency calculus, even if it may be difficult to quantify.

187. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1020-37 (3d ed. 2001)
(reviewing the acquiescence doctrine and its critics); see, e.g., Central Bank, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (rejecting an implied right of action for aiding
and abetting under section 10b of Securities Exchange Act, notwithstanding contrary view
of all eleven federal appeals courts that had considered the matter and that actions of
Congress since 1934 indicated congressional acquiescence); id. at 192 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
188. See H.R. 4247, 99th Cong. (1986) (modifying section 7 to prohibit mergers only
when "there is a significant probability" that the merger "will ...increase the ability to
exercise market power," and abrogating structural presumption in favor of a multifactored approach); Reagan Administration Unveils Antitrust Reform Package; Rodino
Attacks Proposals,50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1253, at 307 (Feb. 20, 1986)
(stating that the purpose of the proposed Act was to "lay[] to rest outmoded economic and
legal analysis of mergers that can be found in older court decisions" and that current
language of section 7 "carries the baggage of decades of inconsistent and economically
unsophisticated merger analysis"). On the other hand, in the same era Congress did not
pass Representative Rodino's bill that would have barred any merger of a large company
"if it is unlikely that such acquisition would serve the public interest." H.R. 3561, 98th
Cong. (1983); see Baxter, Miller Promote New Proposalfrom Administration, Criticize
Rodino Bill, 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1131, at 371 (Sept. 15, 1983).
189. One might interpret recent congressional agitation about foreign acquisition of
U.S. companies as a signal that the current Congress does not favor a national merger
policy that is limited to efficiency considerations. See Neil King, Jr., When Security,
Foreign Investment Collide-Business Groups Fret over Senate Proposal To Require More
Scrutiny of International Deals, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2006, at A4 (noting that
congressional concerns go beyond defense issues). Recent legislation rolling back part of
the FCC's attempt to liberalize media ownership restrictions, after a firestorm of public
opposition, may also be interpreted as congressional support for taking into account
"noneconomic" values (indeed perhaps the value of local control) in merger regulation, at
least in the broadcast industry. See Baker, supra note 27, at 735; Stephen Labaton, Senate
Votes to Restore Media Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at C1 (reporting that a diverse
coalition supported a rollback of FCC rules based on "decline in diversity of voices and
coverage of local news and community events").
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As Professor Hovenkamp noted some time ago, "The concept of
allocative efficiency or wealth maximization must include everything
to which people assign a value."190 Indeed, recent law and economics
scholarship has emphasized that welfare economics broadly
encompasses all effects on the well-being of individuals. 9 ' More
concretely, as demonstrated in the first Part of this Article, the loss of
local control will often have real adverse economic consequences on
communities. Mergers that result in the removal of corporate
headquarters to a distant locale may be inefficient because of these
externalities or because they impair community trust or diminish the
impact of positive social norms on corporate managers."
Ironically, to the extent that the meaning of "competition" has
strayed from its original structural understanding, 93 the case for
considering local control as a factor in merger analysis has perhaps
become even stronger. If "competition" means nothing more than
efficiency,1 94 then there is no textual reason to exclude consideration
of "noncompetitive" external effects from the analysis.' 95 Indeed,
190. Hovenkamp, supra note 150, at 242. The observation that many consumers
profess concern over the loss of locally owned businesses yet buy from cheaper big-box
retailers does not mean that consumers, as citizens, do not prefer local control, given
consumers' well-known collective action problems in pursuing "process" objectives in the
marketplace. See Hovenkamp, supra note 131, at 26 (noting that most people may prefer
a society of small businesses but may be tempted to free ride on the preferences of others
by buying from the low-cost producer because they see their own transactions as too
insignificant to have any effect on preserving small competitors); Kysar, supra note 154, at
601-03 (seeking to explain evidence that consumers often do pay a premium for the same
products derived from socially-preferred production processes, notwithstanding a freerider problem).
191. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, FairnessVersus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV.
961, 968 (2001) ("The welfare economic conception of individuals' well-being is a
comprehensive one. It recognizes not only individuals' levels of material comfort, but also
their degree of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they
might value, however intangible."); see also McDonnell & Farber, supra note 27, at 811
(maintaining that consideration of the effects of antitrust policy on political life is fully
consistent with welfare economics, which generally insists on tracing out the effect of a
policy throughout the many areas in which it may have notable effects).
192. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
193. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 912 (claiming that "evolution of the 'efficiency'
defense under section 7 in the lower courts reveals that structural understandings of
competition are increasingly being subordinated to broader understandings of social
welfare").
194. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 130, at 61; cf 4A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 167,
970cl, at 27 (maintaining that "concentration is important not in itself but because of its
implications for economic performance").
195. Professor Barnes argues persuasively that "[clontrolling external effects of
discretionary power by forcing absentee managers' firms to bear the local costs of their
decisions" is not "analytically different from any regulation of the external effects of
corporate activity such as internalizing the environmental costs of pollution," and that
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some scholars have proposed exactly that. 19 6 To be sure, considering
the effects of delocalization may complicate antitrust economists'
conventional partial equilibrium analysis, which focuses on prices and
quantities in isolated product (or input) markets and ignores other
effects of mergers.'9 7
But it is not economics that rules out
consideration of the effects of the loss of local control.'98 Rather, the
prevailing view that local control should be ignored in antitrust
merger policy is based either on a political choice that the effects do

not merit consideration or is based on administrability concerns. As
to the former, the political choice to ignore local control is
inconsistent with the goals of Congress. As to the latter, the next Part
of this Article addresses administrability concerns by sketching a
number of simple ways that local control may be taken into account
in merger review."'
such externalities are relevant to antitrust law under "Bork's broadened definition of
competition [which] opens the policies of antitrust law to the protection of all things
desirable about competition, that is, to all desirable properties that result from
decentralized market structures." Barnes, supra note 26, at 841, 853.
196. Professor Hammer, for example, maintains that a total welfare standard should
allow courts to consider not only productive efficiencies in merger analysis, but any
"intramarket" market failures, such as negative externalities or "wasteful" nonprice
competition. See Hammer, supra note 150, at 859-67. Thus, a merger of cigarette
companies that would result in increased market power and higher prices might be
permitted if the social costs of smoking exceeded the private costs of cigarettes to
consumers given pre-merger prices and taxes. Id. at 862-63, 887-88. Others have made
similar arguments for a market-failure defense to horizontal restraints under section 1.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to
Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 23-24 (2004) (arguing that
agreements to restrict output of depletable natural resources should be lawful because
they help overcome free-rider problems and enhance long-run consumer welfare);
Christopher R. Leslie, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market FailureDefense
to Horizontal Price-Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REV. 243 (1993) (arguing for a market-failure
defense to price-fixing agreements on efficiency grounds where negative externalities are
high); see also 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1504, at 383 (1978) (contending
that "offsetting a 'market failure' promotes competitive results"). It may be objected that
there is a difference between using efficiency analysis to exculpate an "anticompetitive"
merger and using it to condemn a merger that is not otherwise anticompetitive. However,
that is not what is proposed here. Rather, as set forth below, the loss of local control
would be taken into account only when a merger otherwise raises conventional
competitive concerns.
197. In partial equilibrium analysis, activity in one market is assumed to have little or
no effect on other markets; by contrast, general equilibrium analysis evaluates the effects
of a change in one market on all other markets. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L.
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 579-80 (6th ed. 2005).

198. Cf. Hammer, supra note 150, at 856 & n.15 (arguing that a proper partial
equilibrium analysis should take into account strong economic interactions).
199. This is not to advocate a total welfare standard for antitrust merger analysis,
either in its standard "narrow" form or as expanded to take into account all externalities
of merger decisions. There may be a good efficiency case for considering all external
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III. How SHOULD LOCAL CONTROL BE FACTORED INTO
ANTITRUST MERGER ANALYSIS?

The loss of local control could be taken into account as a factor

in merger analysis in a number of different ways within the bounds of
section 7 of the Clayton Act, including: (1) making local control a
permissive factor to be considered by the enforcement agencies in the
exercise of their prosecutorial discretion; (2) following current merger
standards but shifting the burden of proof of competitive effects in
cases when local control is lost; (3) lowering the concentration
threshold for establishing a prima facie case when a merger eliminates

local control; and (4) restoring the "incipiency doctrine" generally in
recognition of the social costs of mergers, including but not limited to
those associated with the loss of local control. The advantages and
disadvantages of these alternatives are discussed in the next

Section."°
An initial issue that must be addressed, however, is how to
identify a merger that involves a loss of local control. Above, I have
defined delocalization as the transfer of control of a business from
locally based managers to distant or "absentee" managers, which

effects of merger decisions, for example, all job losses in connection with a merger or all
harm to communities, regardless of whether there is a loss of local control. However, the
legislative history does not appear to provide any more support for such an approach than
a narrow total welfare standard. See supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text. But cf.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 n.72 (1962) (suggesting that Congress
was concerned about jobs insofar as it favored internal expansion, "which is more likely to
provide increased investment in plants, more jobs, and greater output" over expansion
through merger, which "is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while
providing no increase in industry capacity, jobs, or output"). An expanded total welfare
standard also would seem to raise significant implementation problems. In contrast,
considering local control as a factor in merger analysis is not only consistent with modern
efficiency analysis, but also is faithful to the historic concerns of Congress and can be
implemented without great difficulty, as the next Part demonstrates.
200. These alternatives assume that local control is treated as a noncompetitive factor
in merger review. See supra note 154. Insofar as consumers have a preference for goods
or services that are produced by local firms, see id., then local control might be
incorporated in conventional merger analysis by giving more emphasis to consumer
choice, rather than to prices. See Averitt & Lande, supra note 154. Thus, for example, a
retail merger that eliminates one of the few locally controlled firms in a local geographic
market would reduce consumer choice and may be suspect on that ground, even if prices
are unaffected (or are lowered). There are difficulties with such an approach, however.
Most significantly, it does not capture the main concern of Congress, which was the effect
of the loss of local control on communities. See supra notes 131-48 and accompanying
text. Indeed, it is precisely because the adverse effects of mergers on communities are
external to the firm (and the consumers that buy from it, even in a local market) that the
marketplace does not accurately reflect the value of preserving local control or the costs of
eliminating it. See supra note 116.
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205

occurs not only when a national or global firm acquires a small
company whose markets or operations are local but also when the
acquired company is a national or global company and its
headquarters is eliminated. 21 Although this definition of the loss of
local control is probably broader than what Congress had in mind in
1950 when it passed the Celler-Kefauver Act, it is consonant with
Congress's overall objectives. °2 Congress probably associated local
control with small businesses and thus, presumably, businesses that3
2
operated on a local, rather than national or international, level. 1
However, given Congress's general goal of preventing further
"economic concentration, ' ' 2° it would not make sense to define the
loss of local control as excluding acquisitions that eliminate the local
headquarters of large companies with national and international
operations. Another subsidiary issue is identifying the relevant
geographic area of control (not to be confused with identifying the
relevant geographic market). For example, has New York City lost
local control when a multinational firm headquartered in Manhattan
is acquired by another multinational headquartered in suburban
Connecticut? What if a Boston-based bank that does business
throughout New England acquires a bank based in Portland, Maine?
As a threshold matter, I would define the relevant geographic area of
control to be the metropolitan area in which a company has its
corporate headquarters. Thus, any merger in which the pre-merger
corporate headquarters of the merging parties are located in different
metropolitan areas would involve a loss of local control.2 5

201. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
202. Under a purposive approach to statutory interpretation, fidelity to congressional
intent does not mean adherence to the specific intent of the framers, but rather to the
general goals of the statute. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 138, at 220-21.
203. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 16,450 (1950) (Senator Kefauver asked, "[Aire we going
to preserve small business, local operations, and free enterprise?"). Moreover, Congress
probably associated local control with local private ownership rather than with public
companies. See supra note 149.
204. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text; see also 95 CONG. REC. 11,486
(1950) (statement of Representative Celler) ("Small, independent, decentralized business
of the kind that built up our country, of the kind that made our country great, first, is fast
disappearing, and second, is being made dependent upon monster concentration.").
205. Some caveats are in order. The locus of control of widely held public companies is
assumed to be the corporate headquarters. However, the locus of control of privately held
companies, or public companies with a controlling shareholder (including subsidiaries of
public companies), is more complicated.
For privately held companies or public
companies with controlling individual shareholders, a company should be considered
"local" to a particular metropolitan area if both the headquarters of the company and the
controlling shareholders are domiciled there. For subsidiaries of public companies, a
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Alternative Approaches

1. Factor Delocalization into Prosecutorial Discretion
An initial, modest step would be for the federal enforcement

agencies to consider the loss of local control as a factor in the
agencies' allocation of enforcement resources, i.e., in deciding which
mergers to investigate, how thoroughly to investigate a merger, and
whether to bring a challenge in close cases.2 °6 Such an approach
would mark a change in recent federal enforcement policy 0 7 but
would be consistent with the horizontal merger guidelines of the
National Association of Attorneys General.
Those guidelines

provide that the consequences of mergers that are "relevant to the
social and political goals of section 7," "may affect the Attorneys
General's ultimate prosecutorial discretion and may help the states
decide which of the possible challenges that are justified on economic
grounds should be instituted.2"' 0 8 The advantage of this approach,

besides the fact that it does not require any change in the law, is that
it is flexible; where the social costs of the loss of local control are

evident, the government could commit more resources to determine
the competitive effects of a merger and could consider those social
costs in determining whether to bring a challenge. 09
company would be local to a metropolitan area only if the headquarters of both the parent
and the subsidiary were located there.
206. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and the
'Common Law' Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 688-89 (1982) (noting that
because of resource constraints "some selectivity is required in initiating resourceconsuming investigations and prosecutions").
207. See Leary, supra note 130, at 112 (FfC commissioner asserting that he was not
aware of "non-economic" factors playing a part in the final decision of the FTC or
Antitrust Division in merger cases in the last twenty years). But see Pitofsky, supra note
158, at 23 (stating that the "reality is that as a matter of prosecutorial discretion ...
prosecutors... will occasionally take social welfare considerations into account").
208. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

ATTORNEYS GENERAL § 2 (1993). Thus, for example, Connecticut's decision to challenge
(successfully) the takeover of Stanley Works by Newell Co. was influenced by the fact that
Stanley was "a Connecticut-based company with a 150 year commitment to the State" and
was "an important employer in Connecticut," and "[tihousands of jobs potentially were at
stake." Richard Blumenthal et al., Antitrust Review of Mergers by State Attorneys General:
The New Cops on the Beat, 67 CONN. BAR J. 1, 12-13 (1993) (noting that "the decision to
expend resources on a challenge was aided by the fact that a successful challenge would
not only maintain competitive markets, but also would preserve an independent
Connecticut-based company").
209. To be sure, the social costs would not be easy to quantify, and perhaps the most
that could be expected would be that enforcers would consider the effects as a tiebreaker
in determining whether to bring a challenge in a close case. Cf.Pitofsky, supra note 149,
at 1067 n.44 (arguing that certain "political concerns" perhaps could serve as a tiebreaker
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2. Shift the Burden of Proof
A somewhat more significant step would be to shift the burden
of persuasion in mergers that involve a loss of local control so that the
proponents of the merger would have the burden of proving that the
merger is not anticompetitive.2 E0
The plaintiff (normally the
government) would still have the initial burden of production in
establishing a prima facie case, but the burden of persuasion on all
contested issues would be on the merging parties. This alternative is
akin to the stance adopted by Justice Douglas when he stated, "The
antitrust laws look with suspicion on the acquisition of local business
units by out-of-state companies., 21 Thus, for example, in an actual
potential competition case involving a loss of local control, such as
FalstaffBrewing, 12 when the question is whether, absent the merger,

in individual merger cases, for example in a merger of very large companies where there
are neither significant anticompetitive effects nor significant efficiencies).
210. The rule would apply only to actions for injunctive relief. Shifting the burden of
persuasion would require a change in the case law, cf United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (burden of persuasion remains with the government "at
all times," even after a prima facie case is established), but probably not a statutory
change, particularly given that section 7 bars mergers "where the effect may be
substantially to lessen competition," see 4 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 149, 9 905b, at 31
(arguing that "in using broad general language, Congress was simply leaving to the courts
the task of determining what specifically must be shown to establish a violation of the
statute in so complex and variegated a field as mergers"). To the extent that the burden of
persuasion in merger cases already allows for something less than a showing that
anticompetitive effects are more likely than not, then shifting the burden of persuasion
would mean placing the risk of uncertainty about the probability of harm on the
defendants. Cf. Michael A. Salinger, Dir. of Bureau of Econ., FTC, Four Questions
About Horizontal Merger Enforcement, Speech to the ABA Economics Committee of the
Antitrust Section Brown Bag Lunch (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.govl
speeches/salinger/050914ababrownbag.pdf (stating that "the correct standard from the
standpoint of economics should not necessarily require a showing that a merger increases
the risk of collusion to more than 50%," depending on the magnitude of the harm if it
occurred).
211. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
212. Falstaff Brewing Corp. was the fourth-largest producer of beer in the United
States, selling beer in most states, but not the Northeast. Narragansett was the largest
seller of beer in New England, with approximately twenty percent of the market. See id.
at 528 (plurality opinion).
The government challenged Falstaff's acquisition of
Narragansett on actual potential competition grounds, namely that absent the acquisition,
Falstaff would have entered the market de novo or by a smaller, toe-hold acquisition. See
id. at 530. The district court found to the contrary, but the Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the district court failed to consider the perceived potential competition issue,
namely whether Falstaff was "so positioned on the edge of the market that it exerted
beneficial influence on competitive conditions in that market." Id. at 532-33. Justice
Douglas, concurring in the judgment, would have reversed the district court's actual
potential competition holding because "although Falstaff might not have made a de novo
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the acquiring firm would likely enter a concentrated market de novo
or through a toehold entry, the burden would be on the merging
parties to establish that the acquiring firm likely would not enter

independently. Or, in a horizontal merger case in which the merging
parties contest the plaintiff's proposed market definition, the
delocalization factor would shift the burden of proof of market
definition from the plaintiff to the merging parties. If the plaintiff

proved its prima facie case based on market concentration, then the
merging parties' burden to rebut that case (say with evidence of entry
or efficiencies) would remain largely the same as under current
methodology,"' except that the ultimate burden of persuasion would
be on the merging parties to show that the merger likely would not

substantially lessen competition.
This burden-shifting approach is simple and measured. It takes
the existing framework of competitive analysis and merely places on
the merging parties the risk of uncertainty of the analysis when a
merger involves noncompetitive social costs that Congress sought to
avoid.214 The main difficulty with this approach is that, as discussed

above, while mergers involving a loss of local control have a tendency
to harm the local community, such harm is not inevitable.2"'

This

raises the question of whether some showing of likely community
harm should be required before the burden-shifting rule is applied.
The familiar tradeoff arises between a general rule and case-by-case
analysis. Any case-by-case analysis of community harm would
complicate merger litigation and perhaps lead to satellite proceedings

over an issue that is not directly related to the main focus, which is
the competitive effect of the merger.216 On the other hand, absent a
entry if it had not been allowed to acquire Narragansett, we cannot say that it would be
unwilling to make such an entry in the future when the New England market might be ripe
for an infusion of new competition." Id. at 544 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas
did not indicate whether he would adopt this laxer standard for all potential competition
cases or merely those involving a loss of local control.
213. However, cognizable efficiencies should not include cost savings that are arguably
attributable to the loss of local control (e.g., elimination of headquarters employees or
reduction in charitable contributions).
214. Insofar as the merging parties can establish that the merger is not likely to
increase market power or facilitate its exercise, the loss of local control would not come
into play. The loss of local control factor would tip the outcome only if an increase in
market power is indeterminate or if the expected net effect on consumer welfare
(considering efficiencies that would be passed on to consumers) is neutral.
215. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
216. Of course, the determination of community harm could be facilitated by the
adoption of simple presumptions. For example, one might presume community harm if
the firm whose headquarters is to be eliminated is predominantly local in its operations or
market or if it is among the top corporate charitable contributors in the metropolitan area.
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209

filter for community harm, some cases would result in burden-shifting
when a community losing a headquarters might actually benefit from
a merger.217 Although a close question, on balance I would not
require any showing of community harm from the loss of local control
as a prerequisite to shifting the burden of proof. The cost of
complicating already complicated merger litigation seems higher than
the cost of "mistakenly" shifting the burden of proof. Indeed, the
welfare loss from a false positive would seem slight. It would arise
when a merger was erroneously barred because of the shift in the
burden of proof (i.e., the merger was not anticompetitive but the
merging parties were unable to prove it), yet the local community
would gain from it. 218

This scenario would be rare because the

instances in which a community losing a corporate headquarters
would gain from a merger are likely to be those in which the acquired
firm is small or distressed," 9 and such mergers are not very likely to
be challenged as anticompetitive. Moreover, the legislative history
suggests that Congress was more concerned about industrial structure
22
than with the particularized consequences of each merger. 1
3. Lower Concentration Thresholds
A third, somewhat more ambitious approach, would employ
burden shifting, as above, but also would lower the market
concentration thresholds at which a horizontal merger involving the
loss of local control is considered presumptively anticompetitive and
would permit the merging parties to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie
case only by demonstrating that the merger would likely benefit
consumers. For example, suppose a national chain with a five percent

The determination could be further simplified by making the presumptions irrebuttable,
although obviously at some cost in accuracy.
217. Absent a filter, the vast majority of interstate mergers would be subject to burden
shifting. However, only a small fraction of deals actually would be affected because so few
raise competitive concerns under current merger standards. See William J. Baer et al.,
Taking Stock: Recent Trends in U.S. Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Spring 2004, at 15
(reporting that second requests for information, "signaling potentially serious antitrust
concerns," were issued in 4.7% of all eligible transactions during the Clinton
administration and in even fewer during the subsequent Bush administration).
218. To be sure, false positives would also include blocked mergers that, if permitted,
would produce productive efficiency gains and no losses to the community. Such an
outcome would be problematic for this analysis if, contrary to the assumption adopted
here, most mergers enhanced economic performance. See supra note 29.
219. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text; cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (noting that Congress favored decentralization even if it
might result in occasional higher costs and prices).
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market share in a local market acquires a local firm in the market
with a twenty-five percent market share. If the rest of the market is
comprised of seven other firms each with a ten percent market share,
then the market would not be considered highly concentrated. Under
current standards, the acquisition would not be presumptively
anticompetitive and, absent unusual circumstances, would not be
" ' Thus, the merger would
challenged. 22
pass muster under the burdenshifting alternative suggested above, even if outside control would
demonstrably harm the local community. Yet the merger legitimately
might be barred as "substantially lessening competition" within the
meaning of the Clayton Act, even if it had no effect on prices. 22 2 To
be sure, the case for blocking such a merger would be weaker if it also
involved significant productive efficiencies likely to benefit
consumers. To avoid the need to balance the costs of the loss of local
control against gains to consumers, a tradeoff that would surely be
controversial, the merger would be allowed to proceed if the merging
parties could demonstrate some net consumer gain. 223 The advantage
of this approach is that it would block more mergers involving the loss
of local control that have no offsetting benefits; the disadvantage
(from a practical perspective) is that it involves a greater departure
from existing doctrine.

221. The agencies use the Hirfindahl Hirshman Index (HHI) as the measure of market
concentration and consider a market to be highly concentrated if the post-merger HHI is
above 1,800. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 155, § 1.51. In the
example, the post-merger HHI would be 1,600, making the market only "moderately
concentrated." Id. While the merger would be subject to further consideration under the
guidelines, in actual practice the agencies would rarely if ever challenge such a merger.
See FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER CHALLENGES DATA, FISCAL YEARS 1999-

2003 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/05/2003/12/mdp.pdf (showing that of the 183
mergers challenged between 1999 and 2003 involving 1,263 relevant markets, only two
markets outside of the petroleum industry had a post-merger HHI of less than 1,800).
222. For administrative simplicity in applying this approach, one could perhaps keep
the current thresholds under the horizontal merger guidelines but add a certain number of
"points" to the post-merger HHI levels to account for the loss of local control, thus
effectively shifting the burden of proof to the merging parties at a lower concentration
level. As with the second alternative, the question of whether to have a filter for
community harm would remain. For the reasons stated above, I would not require a
particularized showing of community harm.
223. This is in contrast to the second approach under which the merger would be
permitted if the merging parties demonstrate no net consumer loss. Like the second
approach, however, any consumer benefit must be net of costs that may be attributable to
the loss of local control. See supra note 213.
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4. Restore Incipiency Doctrine

A fourth approach would recognize the loss of local control as
one of a number of adverse social consequences of economic
concentration that Congress sought to avoid. This approach would
support lower market concentration thresholds in general and a
greater use of the "incipiency doctrine" to attack mergers with
uncertain anticompetitive effects.224 Several scholars have taken this
approach in the past.225 Such an approach has much to recommend it
because, among other reasons, it requires no case-by-case (or
category-by-category) analysis of adverse "social" effects. 226 And, in
truth, this approach is not far from the second and third proposals,
given that those proposals call for burden shifting in the vast majority
of interstate mergers without specific proof of adverse community
harm. On the other hand, the second and third proposals' somewhat
more nuanced approach may be more persuasive given the public
224. The incipiency doctrine calls for strict anti-merger enforcement. See Robert H.
Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery to Consumer Choice, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 875, 878 (2001). The incipiency concept was part of the original section 7, see United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957) ("Section 7 is designed
to arrest in its incipiency ... the substantial lessening of competition"), and was
reinvigorated in the Celler-Kefauver Act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 317 & nn.32 & 33 (1962) (stating that Congress provided "authority for arresting
mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition ... was still in its
incipiency"). While the doctrine can be understood in various ways, the essence seems to
be that courts should err on the side of over-enforcement. See Lande, supra, at 881.
Lande notes that courts and enforcers have usually ignored the doctrine in recent years.
See id. at 888. But see, e.g., United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850, 85859 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court's dismissal of a merger challenge to a partial
acquisition, citing the incipiency doctrine).
225. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 149, at 1069-71 (arguing that a relatively low
concentration threshold is an appropriate way to account for Congress's concern about a
myriad of adverse "political" consequences of mergers); Bok, supra note 135, at 305-08
(arguing that uncertainties in merger policy should be resolved consistently with basic
value premises and broad political and economic objectives of Congress; and that the
"burdens of our ignorance [should] fall upon the merging firms and not upon the public
interest in maintaining competition and restraining monopoly power"); cf Louis B.
Schwartz, "Justice"and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076,
1080-81 (1979) ("[T]he weight of the non-economic and non-quantitative goals of antitrust
should shift to anyone seeking to justify a monopoly or a 'suspect' anti-competitive
practice the burden of persuading the tribunal that the justification is established by clear
and convincing evidence."). Arguably, this was also the approach of the Warren Court in
the 1960s, although a restoration of the incipiency doctrine would not require a return to
Warren-era standards. See Lande, supra note 224, at 875.
226. This approach of ratcheting up enforcement in general to account for adverse
social consequences of mergers may be seen as a mirror image of the approach of some
conservative legal scholars who have argued that efficiencies in merger analysis should be
taken into account by establishing high general thresholds of illegality rather than
adopting an efficiencies defense. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 130, at 219.
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salience of the local control issue, the empirical grounding of the

adverse effects, and the particular significance of the issue in the
legislative history. On balance, given the practical realities of what is
possible, the burden-shifting approach following current merger

standards (the second alternative) seems the most promising
alternative for those who accept the analysis offered here.
B.

Should Preservationof Local Control Be a Defense to an
Anticompetitive Merger?
On the one hand, a "local control" defense to an anticompetitive

merger might make some sense because a firm's ability to benefit the
community may be in some tension with the degree of competition it
faces. If benefit to the community is partly a result of managerial
slack, and if product-market competition is a constraint on that slack,

then one would expect that increased product-market competition
would limit the ability of a firm to benefit the community.

27

Indeed,

insofar as the level of charitable contributions is largely a function of
a firm's profits, monopoly may be a community's best friend.228
However, while it is clear from the legislative history discussed above
that Congress was concerned with local control and the harm to the

communities that may result from acquisitions that eliminate it, there
is no indication that Congress intended to subordinate the value of
"competition" to those concerns, to the extent they conflicted.2 29

227. See generally Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation,47
AM. ECON. REV. 311, 315 (1957) ("Only the ability to continue to earn a substantial
surplus over costs makes possible a variety of expenditures whose benefits are broad,
uncertain, and distant; the enterprise closely constrained by the pressures of market
competition does not have that ability."); see also Brown et al., supra note 59, at 16-17
(finding that firms that earn more economic rent give more); Katherine E. Maddox &
John J. Siegfried, The Effect of Economic Structure on Corporate Philanthropy, in
ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, supra note 26, at 202, 219 (finding a positive impact of market
power on giving).
228. Of course, if a merger-to-monopoly leads to a reduction in output as a result of
increased market power, then the community might suffer from a loss of employment by
the monopolist and its suppliers.
229. Congress did drop language in the original bill that would have barred mergers
that substantially lessened competition "in any community," in favor of language referring
to "any section of the country," in order to make clear that the Act did not "go so far as to
prevent any local enterprise in a small town from buying up another local enterprise in the
same town." See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 4 (1950) (emphasis added). However, that does
not suggest that Congress intended to immunize local mergers that actually lessened
competition. But cf United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 298 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the merger should be permitted in part because it
"clearly comported with the desirability of retaining local control over industry that the
Court noted in Brown Shoe" (internal quotes omitted)).
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Thus, at least absent a failing firm, it should be no defense to an
anticompetitive merger that the acquisition would preserve local
control or otherwise benefit the community. The premise of the
proposals offered here is that local control should be a factor in
merger analysis when it does not conflict with conventional
competitive concerns.23 °
IV. LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

To the extent that delocalization is a pressing social issue, even
the most aggressive proposal offered here would contribute only
modestly in redressing it. Because section 7 of the Clayton Act only
prohibits mergers that may substantially "lessen competition," there
are obvious limits to the Act's constraint on mergers that involve a
loss of local control. Most mergers involving a loss of local control
would likely be unaffected by the proposals because they do not raise
substantial competitive concerns.
Moreover, mergers that are
resolved with partial divestitures would not be affected. Further, in
some sectors of the economy the greatest threat to local control of
businesses probably does not come from the acquisition of locally
based firms by distant ones but rather from the expansion of national
firms into markets previously dominated by local firms, for example,
231
as "big box" retailers replace local or regional merchants.
However, even if the role of the Clayton Act in redressing
delocalization is necessarily limited, that does not mean that antitrust
should ignore the issue entirely when doing
so risks undermining
232
Congress.
of
intent
the
and
welfare
social

230. Thus, the proposals are consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition in
Philadelphia National Bank that "a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially to
lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial." Unites States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the merger was
justified because Philadelphia "needs a bank larger than it now has in order to bring
business to the area and stimulate its economic development").
231. See, e.g., Stephan J. Goetz & Hema Swaminathan, Wal-Mart and County-Wide
Poverty (2004), http://cecd.aers.psu.edu/pubs/PovertyResearchWm.pdf (finding that, after
controlling for various factors affecting poverty rates, county-level poverty rates increased
more in counties that had more Wal-Marts and hypothesizing that the effect may be due in
part to Wal-Mart's adverse impact on local leadership capacity).
232. But cf 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, T 111, at 107 (arguing that an
antitrust policy that sought to preserve smaller business units would be futile because "so
long as growth or diversification by internal expansion is permitted, inefficiently small or
undiversified firms must either expand or expire: prohibition on mergers will not preserve
them").
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Local Control as a Factorin Bank Mergers

Industry-specific regulation may offer greater promise in
addressing the problems of delocalization in certain industries, such
as banking.233 While a complete analysis of the issues is beyond the

scope of this Article, the outlines of an approach for bank mergers
are easy to discern. The issue of delocalization in bank mergers is
particularly salient because of the important role banks have played
historically in the social and financial development of communities.2 34

Moreover, bank mergers are not governed merely by a lessening-ofcompetition standard. Before approving a bank merger under the
Bank Merger Act, federal regulators must consider factors in addition

to competitive effects, including "the convenience and needs of the
community to be served"23' 5 and the banks' record of performance

under the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), which imposes on
banks a "continuing.and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit
23 6
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered.
Professor Carstensen stated the case for local control of banks in
terms of civic leadership and philanthropy:

233. Broadcast regulation may offer another avenue of addressing these concerns given
the FCC's mandate to promote "localism" in regulating media ownership and its historical
favoritism of local owners in broadcast applications. See Paul Cowling, An Earthy
Enigma: The Role of Localism in the Political, Cultural and Economic Dimensions of
Media Ownership Regulation, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 263-66, 354-55
(2005) (describing traditional FCC views of localism and defending the value of local
ownership).
234. See, e.g., Richard E. Ratcliff et al., The Civic Involvement of Bankers: An Analysis
of the Influence of Economic Power and Social Prominence in the Command of Civic
Policy Positions, 26 SOC. PROBS. 298 (1979) (detailing high level of civic involvement by
bank directors in a major metropolitan area).
235. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2000). Indeed, an anticompetitive merger is permitted
if "the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and
needs of the community to be served." Id.; see also id. § 1842(c)(1)-(2) (setting the same
standards under the Bank Holding Company Act). Considering the loss of local control as
a factor under the convenience and needs analysis is not precluded by circuit cases holding
that bank regulators may not deny a merger application on the basis of a "competitive
standard" more stringent than the Clayton Act and that anticompetitive effects may not
be considered under the convenience and needs analysis. See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Sav. Bank
v. FDIC, 482 F.2d 459, 465 (9th Cir. 1973). Whatever the merits of this case law, it is no
impediment because local control is largely a noncompetitive factor, albeit one that is
relevant under the Clayton Act as properly understood. See supra note 154 and
accompanying text.
236. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3) (congressional finding in preamble to act). See generally
Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513 (2005) (defending the CRA against criticism that has plagued the
Act since its inception).
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[Blanks and their top executives have historically played vital
roles in local social and political activity. Individual bankers
make discretionary contributions of their time to the
betterment of their communities. Equally important, individual
bankers can command the financial resources of their bank to
make contributions to the community both by providing
charitable donations and by supporting
a wide range of
2 37
community development activities.
Carstensen argued:
If the bank ceases to be locally controlled, managers will be less
likely to exercise their discretion to expend time on projects
which bring local recognition yet lack support or recognition at
corporate headquarters. Similarly, direct contributions and
other assistance will now rest upon the discretion of corporate
managers far removed from the locality, making such assistance
less likely to occur. Both of these losses will impoverish society
as a whole, even if they do not show up as a direct economic
cost of allowing major bank combinations. 3 8
Beyond the loss of civic leadership and philanthropy, there are
reasons to believe that local economic growth may be stunted by the
acquisition of local banks by national banks. 39 It is widely accepted
that "[l]ocal banks are more likely to meet the credit needs of small
businesses, because they are better able than out-of-town banks to
evaluate and monitor the performance of local firms to which they
lend., 240
And several studies show that small-business lending
237. Peter C. Carstensen, Public Policy Toward Interstate Bank Mergers: The Casefor
Concern, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1397, 1425 (1989).
238. Id.
239. One recent study concluded that, in metropolitan areas, "out-of-market ownership
of bank offices is associated with lower short-run growth rates," although the magnitude of
this effect was economically small, and no negative effects were found in nonmetropolitan
areas. Robert N. Collender & Sherrill Shaffer, Local Bank Office Ownership, Deposit
Control, Market Structure, and Economic Growth, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 27, 54 (2003)
("[R]esults indicate greater cause for concern about bank ownership patterns in
metropolitan areas than in non-metropolitan areas.").
240. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big To Fail, Too Few To Serve? The PotentialRisks
of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1038 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too Big to
Fail]; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. FinancialServices
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 261-62 (noting that "community-oriented banks continue to provide a majority
of the bank credit extended to small firms, notwithstanding their declining share of the
industry's assets," and offering several reasons for the evident superiority of smaller banks
in providing credit to small businesses). Collender and Shaffer note that "[s]mall, local
banks may behave differently from larger nonlocal banks for a variety of reasons,
including superior access to information, greater commitment to local prosperity, and
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declines when local banks are acquired by large nonlocal banks,
although such reductions may be mitigated by the creation of new
local banks.24 1 Moreover, there is evidence that local banks tend to

reinvest more of their locally generated funds in their communities
than nationwide banks.242
In recent years, the issue of the loss of local control has been

raised by objectors in numerous large interstate bank mergers,
including, for example, Bank of America's acquisition of
FleetBoston.243 The issue has been duly noted by the Federal Reserve
Board and then essentially ignored. The Board "weighs" all claims of

future community harm against the banks' existing performance
under the Community Reinvestment Act, generally concluding in
boilerplate language that "considerations relating to the convenience
and needs factor, including the CRA performance records of the

relevant depository institutions, are consistent with approval of the
2

proposal." 4
The issue of the loss of local control deserves more than a
glancing nod under the rubric of CRA performance. In the first

differences in technology (cost structure) or risk management related to bank size."
Collender & Shaffer, supra note 239, at 53.
241. See Rebel A. Cole et al., Cookie Cutter vs. Character: The Micro Structure of
Small Business Lending by Large and Small Banks, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 227, 229 (2004) (reviewing studies of effects of mergers on lending to small
businesses); see also Allen N. Berger et al., Does Function Follow OrganizationalForm?
Evidence from the Lending Practicesof Large and Small Banks, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 266
(2005) (concluding that "bank consolidation may raise meaningful concerns for small
firms" because "large banks lend primarily to larger firms with good accounting records
... [,] lend at a greater distance, interact more impersonally with their borrowers, have
shorter and less exclusive relationships, and are not as effective at alleviating credit
constraints").
242. See Wilmarth, Too Big To Fail,supra note 240, at 1045. But see Geoffrey Miller,
Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1083,
1109-10 (1992) (questioning the proposition that large banks tend to drain credit from
local communities).
243. See Bank of Am. Corp., 2004 WL 474646, at *3 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Mar. 8, 2004)
(order approving merger) (noting objections that the merger would "result in the loss of
local control over lending and investment decisions" and concern about potential adverse
affects that might result from the "loss of a major financial institution headquartered in
New England"); see also J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2004 WL 1369433, at *2 (Fed Reserve
Bd. June 14, 2004) (order approving merger) (noting concerns expressed about "the loss
of local control over lending and investment decisions in a merger between two large
banks"); NationsBank Corp., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 858, 867 (1998) (noting concerns "that the
merger would result in the loss of local control over lending decisions and the relocation of
a major financial institution currently headquartered in San Francisco").
244. Bank of America Corp., 2004 WL 474646, at *22. Numerous other approvals have
followed the same formula, generally without substantively addressing the issue of the loss
of local control. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2004 WL 1369433, at *24.
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place, the loss of local control may be inconsistent with the
convenience and needs of the community not only because it may
lessen the bank's commitment to meeting the community's credit
needs under the CRA, but also because it may impair the bank's role
in the leadership and philanthropy of the community and other facets
of its performance.2 45 Secondly, even if meeting local credit and
investment needs were the only issue raised by the loss of local
control, it would hardly be sufficient to look at the past record of the
merging banks' CRA performance, as the board does in making its
convenience and needs determination,2 46 when the question raised is
whether the change in the structure and ultimate management of the
acquired bank will have a negative impact on the bank's meeting the
convenience and needs of its local community in the future. The fact
that past performance of the banks (acquired or acquiring) is
generally satisfactory has little bearing on this question. It would be
more relevant to the local control issue to compare the acquiring
245. Concerns about philanthropy and leadership would seem to fit comfortably within
the meaning of "convenience and needs of the community." See United States v. Third
Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1968) (noting that the convenience and
needs of the community was made a defense to anticompetitive merger because of
Congress's recognition of the importance of "the role of banks in a community's economic
life"); see also Bank of New Bern v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 643, 648
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (holding that one factor in the convenience and needs determination is
the "extent to which management of existing banks has been active and vigorous as
evidenced by the assumption of leadership and participation in economic growth of the
community").
To be sure, the Federal Reserve Board has maintained that the
convenience and needs factor relates to the quality of banking services in the community,
so that, for example, loss of local employment is not a relevant consideration. See, e.g.,
Wells Fargo & Co., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 445, 457 (1996). Yet, even if the Board is correct,
arguably philanthropy and civic leadership are traditional components of "banking
services" provided to the community. But see Bank of America Corp., 2004 WL 474646, at
*11 n.46 ("[N]either CRA nor the agencies' implementing rules require that institutions
engage in charitable giving.").
246. The board treats the merger approval process as an occasion for assessing past
CRA compliance, and denial of approval is essentially a penalty for prior unsatisfactory
performance by either party. See Bank of America Corp., 2004 WL 474646, at *20 ("[T]o
gain approval of a proposal to acquire an insured depository institution an applicant must
demonstrate a satisfactory record of performance under the CRA without reliance on
plans or commitments for future action."). This is consistent with the CRA, which
requires the banking agencies to consider a bank's "record" of CRA performance in
considering merger (and other) applications. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(2) (2000); see also id.
§ 1831.u(3)(B) (providing that in determining whether to approve an interstate bank
merger, the agency shall "take into account the most recent written evaluation" of CRA
performance).
However, nothing in the statute precludes a banking agency from
considering whether past satisfactory performance will be maintained in the future.
Indeed, insofar as CRA performance is an element of the convenience and needs test,
which is forward-looking, then an assessment of future compliance would seem to be
required.
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bank's CRA performance at its branch outposts, if any, to the
performance of the acquired bank in its home community. If the
relative performance of the acquired bank is stronger, then it would
be difficult to find that the merger is consistent with the convenience
and needs of the community, at least absent countervailing
considerations.
More generally, given the potential adverse consequences of the
loss of local control, it would be appropriate to adopt a presumption
that the acquisition of a bank that eliminates local control is not
consistent with the convenience and needs of the community,
particularly when the bank to be acquired is the last remaining
significant locally based bank in a metropolitan area or region. To
gain approval by regulators, the merging banks would have to rebut
the presumption by establishing either that the loss of local control
would not lessen community leadership, philanthropy, or
commitment to community lending and investment or that such a loss
would be outweighed by other benefits to the community (such as a
more competitive banking market) that could not be achieved by less
2 47
restrictive alternatives.
At one point in the not-too-distant past, the Board considered
local control to be a positive factor in the convenience and needs
determination.2 48 Even in the 1990s, bank regulators in a few merger
247. This proposal is similar to Professor Carstensen's proposal for a general
presumption against large interstate bank mergers because of the likelihood of a number
of adverse social consequences-including the loss of local control-and the unlikelihood
of public benefits. See Carstensen, supra note 237, at 1431, 1435 ("[P]roperly understood
... the convenience and needs criterion itself creates a presumption against bank
combinations which have any potential negative effects unless the specific combination
also has offsetting positive effects."). It is worth noting that the evidence for the efficiency
of bank mergers (and increased shareholder value) is arguably even weaker than for
mergers in general. See David A. Becher et al., Interstate Banking Deregulation and the
Changing Nature of Bank Mergers, 28 J. FIN. RES. 1, 15 (2005) (finding that bank mergers
in the post-deregulation 1990s resulted in more than $10 billion in wealth destruction);
Pautler, supra note 128, at 159 (reviewing studies on bank mergers and concluding that
"[tjhe weakness of the evidence regarding beneficial cost efficiency effects ... is a bit ...
surprising ... [g]iven the received wisdom in the literature that banks generally are not
very efficient"); see also Valerie Bauerlein & Clint Riley, Bank of America Seeks a
Crown-Once-Small Company May Topple Citigroup as Market-Value King After 128%
Growth in Last Five Years, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2006, at C1 (explaining that the strong
performance of Bank of America's stock price was due in part to the fact that future
mergers were barred; "fewer investors are spooked by the possibility that Bank of
America will make an acquisition with a fat premium" since the bank had reached ten
percent regulatory cap on national deposits).
248. See, e.g., Tulsa Commerce Bancshares, Inc., 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 196, 197 (1982)
(permitting the formation and acquisition of a bank holding company where the
application would solidify local ownership of bank and perpetuate current management,
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cases gave more fulsome attention to the local control issue. 249 There
is no reason that local control may not be given renewed significance
today. To be sure, the Riegle-Neal Act of 199450 eased historical
restrictions on interstate bank acquisitions and interstate branching
that had been designed to "retain local, community-based control
over banking. 2 ' 1 Yet, it would be a mistake to view the Riegle-Neal
Act as a repudiation of Congress's concern about local control in
banking. Rather, the Act seems designed to balance Congress's
desire to obtain the efficiency benefits of interstate banking without
sacrificing the advantages provided by locally based banks. 2 Placing
and recognizing the "general public interest in facilitating local ownership"); Union of
Ark. Corp., 66 Fed. Res. Bull. 659, 660 (1980) ("[A]pproval would probably serve to
preserve local control of Bank, which the Board finds is generally in the public interest.");
Cont'l Bancor, Inc., 57 Fed. Res. Bull. 676, 676 (1971) ("Considerations relating to the
convenience and needs of the communities to be served lend weight toward approval of
the application since the proposal involves the substitution of local for non-local
ownership and such ownership will be more likely to be aware of and sensitive to the
banking needs of the Phoenix area.").
249. For example, in a merger of two of the four banks in Charlevoix, Michigan, the
Federal Reserve Board addressed objections that the elimination of local ownership of the
target bank would have a negative impact on the convenience and needs of the
community. CB Fin. Corp., 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 118, 121-24 (1993). The Board concluded
that "there would be no loss of expertise or knowledge of special credit needs in the
communities served" because the board of the merged bank would consist of persons
familiar with the Charlevoix area and senior management would be made up of current
officers of the merged banks who would continue to reside in the Charlevoix area. Id. at
121 n.21. It is rather ironic, to say the least, that the local control issue got more
consideration in the Charlevoix merger (summer population: 20,000) than in megamergers that leave entire metropolitan areas and regions without any locally based major
banks. See also Bank of Am. Ill., 1997 WL 402558, at *6 (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) (June 25, 1997) (concluding that merger would not negatively affect bank's
responsiveness to local needs based on mechanisms put in place to ensure local input).
250. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2000)).
251. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 172
(1985). See generally Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the
Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996) (examining the passage of the
Riegle-Neal Act and its scope).
252. The Senate Banking Committee stated that it did "not believe that increasing the
opportunities for interstate banking [would] reduce the important role of regional and
community banks. These institutions, with special knowledge of their communities,
contribute to the vigor of local economies throughout the country." S. REP. No. 103-240,
at 11 (1994). Further, the Riegle-Neal Act reaffirmed the importance the Community
Reinvestment Act. Id. at 15 (stating that "banks have an obligation to promote economic
growth, including the credit needs of their communities" and thus the bill "ensures that
the principles of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) will be observed under the
system of interstate banking"). And the Act established concentration limits so that a
bank could not make an acquisition that would result in it controlling more than ten
percent of national deposits. See Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102, 108 Stat. 2343, 2345 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(u) (2000)). One commentator has noted that "It]he statute does not
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the onus on the merging parties to demonstrate those benefits when
local control is sacrificed in a particular case would serve those
purposes.
CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to restore the significance of one of the
important historical concerns of Congress in restricting largecompany mergers under the Clayton Act, namely the increasing
delocalization of the control of business in America. Senator
Kefauver's fear of an economy run by corporations "with central
office managers remote from the places where their products are
made, and the destiny of the people determined by the decisions of
persons whom they never see, or even know of" was that such
corporations were less socially responsible than local companies.
That fear finds support in the modern social science literature.
Corporate hometowns tend to fare better than branch towns for both
"sentimental" and profit-maximizing reasons. The elimination of
corporate headquarters through merger not only may have adverse
social consequences for communities but also, as recent law and
economics literature suggests, may impair efficiency by undermining
the trust of corporate stakeholders and by making corporate
managers less responsive to social norms.
Of course, the fact that large-company mergers that eliminate
local control may have certain adverse social or economic
consequences does not necessarily mean that such mergers impair net
social welfare or that public policy (antitrust or otherwise) should
restrict them. If one believes productive efficiency gains from
mergers are large, and the social costs relatively small, then the
appropriate policy response would not be to restrict mergers,
although compensation for communities for their losses might be
justifiable. On the other hand, if one believes the efficiency gains
from large mergers are questionable and the social costs significant,
then such mergers ought to be restricted at least to the extent of
requiring the proponents of a given merger to demonstrate the
benefits of the merger before it is permitted to proceed. That is
essentially the policy advocated in this Article for large interstate
bank mergers under federal banking law.
Antitrust's role in restricting mergers with adverse social
consequences is necessarily limited by its focus on competitive effects.
take a wrecking ball to the banking industry, or to traditional notions of the close
relationship between banks and their communities." Rollinger, supra note 251, at 268.
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However, this Article has argued that there is room in modern
antitrust doctrine, within the domain of mergers that are plausibly
anticompetitive, to take into account the social consequences of
delocalization. By raising the bar for permitting mergers that involve
the loss of local control, even if only by making delocalization a
legitimate factor in the federal agencies' determination of whether to
bring close cases, antitrust would be taking a small step doctrinally
towards addressing an important social issue but a large step
ideologically in going beyond narrowly defined "economic" concerns.
Given the evolution in modern law and economics toward broader
conceptions of efficiency, it would be a step back to the future.
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